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The purpose of the Navy's breakout program is "to
improve the acquisition status of replenishment spare parts
through either, (1) identification of the actual
manufacturer of an item, or (2) the competitive procurement
of a part that was previously purchased noncompetitively.
"
[Ref. l:p. S6-103.6] The program, as established by the
Department of Defense (DOD) in 1983, had the annual buy
value (ABV) as its determinator of candidate items. Since
1983 considerable sophistication has evolved in the breakout
determination process. In particular, three models have
been developed by various services to replace the ABV
approach. This thesis develops a similar model for Navy
use. Since such models depend on technical data, the
procuring of such data is also considered. The obvious
conclusion is that technical data should be obtained during
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Since its inception in 1983, Breakout has played a very
important role in generating second sources for many
existing items stocked in the Navy Supply System. Breakout
is the process of improving the acquisition status of
replenishment spare parts through either, (1) identification
of the actual manufacturer of an item, or (2) the
competitive procurement of a part that was previously
purchased noncompetitively. [Ref. l:p. S6-103.6]
The general breakout procedure is to review sole source
items of supply, which broach a threshold of $10,000 annual
buy value (ABV) , for technical data sufficient to make
subsequent reprocurements competitively. If the government
possesses the technical data to competitively reprocure the
item, then open competition results. However, in many cases
the technical data is lacking and/or cannot be procured from
the original equipment manufacturer, and the reprocurement
usually reverts to a sole source buy. The Breakout program
is geared to procure technical data for items that are
deemed economically feasible upon completion of the
technical review process.
When first mandated by the Defense Acquisition
Regulation Supplement No. 6 in June 1983, the pool of
candidates within the Navy Supply System for technical
review was rather large. The supply system contained over
500,000 items managed by the Ships Parts Control Center
(SPCC) , and over 247,000 managed by the Aviation Supply
Office (ASO) . Due to this large pool and the rather low
level of competitive procurements at the time (only 21.1%
for SPCC and 9.1% for ASO), determining breakout candidates
was a relatively easy process. [Ref. 2:p. 4]
In recent years determining breakout candidates has
become more difficult due to a reduction of this pool
through Breakout success and other methods (e.g., BOSS,
Price Fighter, Reverse Engineering, and improved competitive
measures in new weapon systems acquisitions.) What was once
a "target rich environment" for Breakout candidates is
beginning to dwindle. To ensure the continuing success of
the Navy's Breakout Program, a more refined breakout
candidate predictor is necessary.
B. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH
The objective of this study is to develop a better
methodology to use in breakout candidate determination, and
to apply this methodology to the provisioni^^g process. The
applications will be limited to the two Navy Inventory
Control Points (the Ships Parts Control Center at
Mechanicsburg, PA, and the Aviation Supply Office at
Philadelphia.
)
C. SCOPE OF THE STUDY, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS
The study focused on the breakout of replenishment spare
parts and the associated relationship with the provisioning
process. The economic model and assumptions of the
Department of the Defense (DOD) Breakout process were
considered and changes proposed when evidence justified it.
Component breakout (i.e., breakout on a form, fit, or
function level) and other areas of competition were not the
central concern of this research, but are mentioned when
appropriate to the case under study.
Though breakout models and methodology from other
services are discussed, the intent of this thesis is to
develop an improved Navy breakout model. No attempt is made
to develop a better DOD-wide model, nor is any effort made
to analyze the application of the new model to the breakout
operations of other services.
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The research methodology utilized in this study involved
first an indepth review of the available literature,
followed by personal interviews with both policy and
operational persons involved with the breakout process.
The literature utilized in this study was obtained from
the Naval Supply Systems Command; the Naval Sea Systems
Command; the Ships Parts Control Center; the Aviation Supply
Office; the Fleet Material Support Office; the Naval Sea
Systems Command Logistics Center, Mechanicsburg; the Army
Procurement Research Office; the General Accounting Office;
the Naval Postgraduate School Library; the Defense Logistics
Information Exchanges (DLSIE) ; and the Defense Technical
Information Center (DTIC)
.
Personal interviews were conducted with logistics and
technical personnel at the Ships Parts Control Center; the
Fleet Material Support Office; the Aviation Supply Office;
and the Naval Sea Systems Command Logistics Center.
Telephone interviews were conducted with policy personnel at
the Office of the Secretary of Defense; the Office of the
Secretary of the Navy; and the Naval Supply Systems Command.
All personal and telephone interviews were informal and
structured around the guidelines provided by the questions
stated in Appendix A.
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
A brief discussion of breakout and provisioning is
provided as Chapter II. It is followed by a review of three
existing breakout models in Chapter III. These breakout
models were developed by different services and contain
elements which have potential for application to the Navy's
replenishment breakout process.
A proposed breakout model for use at the Navy ICPs is
then presented in Chapter III, and is the major contribution
of this thesis. Chapter IV discusses several issues related
to the breakout process which were discovered during the
research, but which cannot be quantified as part of any
model
.
Chapter V presents a summary of the thesis, conclusions
drawn from the research, and recommendations for the
application of the research results.
II. THE CURRENT PROVISIONING-BREAKOUT PROCESS
A . BACKGROUND
Provisioning and breakout have grown into two of the
major ongoing processes at the Navy's Inventory Control
Points (ICP) . The most widely accepted definition of
provisioning in both the supply and technical community is
[Ref. 3:p. B-6]:
Provisioning is the process of determining and acquiring
the range and depth of new items of spares and repair
parts, and support and test equipment required to
operate and maintain an end item or material for an
initial period of service
c
Provisioning is a procedure by which the U.S. Navy supplies
and outfits its ships and other activities. Simplified,
provisioning is an incremental process required to develop
the initial Allowance Parts List (APL) from Provisioning
Technical Documentation (PTD) provided by a contractor.
This procedure is initiated upon the award of a government
contract for equipment. Provisioning is an involved process
which begins with delivery of PTD to an In-Service
Engineering Activity (ISEA) for technical review and
acceptance. PTD then flows to an ICP which completes
technical item coding and supply management coding, makes
stock/allowance computations, and decides on other issues
relative to inventory management. The end product APL
identifies a component and its parts as well as the range
and depth of material required for support. The APL is
ultimately integrated into the Coordinated Shipboard
Allowance List (COSAL) for use by shipboard personnel to
order parts and off-load parts not required on board. [Ref.
4:p. IA-1-1]
Breakout is associated with existing items of supply.
Its purpose is to make items competitively reprocurable.
Breakout is defined as [Ref. 1: p. S6-103.6]:
The improvement of the acquisition status of a part
resulting from deliberate management decision. Examples
are:
(i) the competitive acquisition of a part previously
purchased noncompetitively, and
(ii) the direct purchase of a part previously purchased
from a prime contractor who is not the actual
manufacturer of the part.
The process involves the identification, selection,
screening and procurement of technical data for items where
savings on future reprocurements are expected to exceed the
costs associated with doing the breakout process. The
technical review results in the assignment of an Acquisition
Method Code (AMC) and an Acquisition Method Suffix Code
(AMSC) . The AMC is a numeric code which describes the
result of a technical review of a part, and it ranges from
"item is fully competitive" to "acquire item only from prime
contractor." [Ref. l:p. S6-201.1] The complete list of
AMCs is included in Appendix B. The AMSC is an alpha code
which further describes the AMC by adding information
concerning the status of a part in areas of engineering.
manufacturing and technical data. These range from
"government has full rights to use the data" to "the design
of this part is unstable." [Ref. l:p. S6-201.2] The
complete list of AMSCs is included as Appendix C.
The combination of these codes form a matrix which is
used by contracting personnel to determine the correct
method of competition that can be used to procure the item.
The Acquisition Method/Suffix Code Correlation Table is
included as Appendix D.
The requirement to perform breakout reviews is not
applicable to parts in provisioning. [Ref. l:p. S6-101]
The reason is one of expediency. The process of reviewing
and collecting the technical data in order to make an item
competitive is time-consuming. To hinder items in the
provisioning process would incur a greater risk of material
nonavailability early in the equipment's life. This
nonavailability could have negative impact on fleet
readiness. [Ref. 5]
At first glance it might appear that the concepts of
provisioning and breakout are not mutually agreeable. In
fact, the two are quite complimentary, especially in regard
to technical data. As will be discussed later, the
availability of technical data is at the crux of successful
item breakout. Provisioning is the process where the
Government has the best chance of procuring the required
technical documentation. Heretofore, these two processes
have been considered as independent. It is an intent of
this thesis to argue for a stronger bond between breakout
and provisioning.
B. THE PROVISIONING PROCESS
Provisioning begins with the receipt of PTD from a
contractor. It can either be in paper or computer tape
format. The information that makes up the PTD package
includes drawings, part? lists, technical manuals,
performance data, and any other appropriate procurement
data. The more detailed the PTD, the better the final APL
and supply support for the item will be.
The provisioning process is an eight-step process. Each
PTD package received is identified to a project and is
screened for an existing APL. Prior to induction into the
provisioning process, PTD packages are checked to see if an
APL already exists. If the PTD package can be matched to an
existing APL, then the package is returned by the ICP to the
submitting activity (i.e., an equipment contractor or
shipbuilder) indicating the existing APL number. If the
project cannot be matched to an already existing APL, then
the following process results:
(1) PTD Receipt and Review. During this phase the
provisioner validates the line data for errors or
missing data elements. Corrections and additions are
made. This review can be either done manually if
paper PTD is received, or via electronic review on
the Ships Provisioning System (SPS) if the PTD was
received via electronic tape. PTD is the
skeletonized framework from which all the required
supply and management codes for the items will be
attached throughout the provisioning process.
(2) Lead APL flAPL) Review. This step is applicable only
to Hull, Mechanical & Electrical (HM&E) provisioning.
The applicable LAPL for a provisioning project is
called up on the computer terminal and technical
coding is assigned to the line items in the project.
Technical coding is developed by the Hardware System
Command (HSC) engineering activity, and consists of
data elements such as replacement factors,
essentiality coding, allowance overrides and source,
maintenance and recoverability (SM&R) codes.
Technical coding for non-HM&E equipments is developed
as part of the equipment contracts and is included as
part of the PTD package received from the contractor.
(3) Defense Logistics Services Center fPLSC) Screening.
All manufacturers' FSCM/part numbers are screened
against the DLSC files to determine if an existing
stock number already exists, thus negating any
further cataloging requirements. After this
mechanized screening is completed. Navy Item Control
Numbers (NICNs) are assigned to all items which did
10
not cross to a stock number. These non-crossed items
will be logged into the DLSC system and assigned a
stock number in the future.
(4) Item Coding. Upon completion of the DLSC screening,
the provisioner will assign various supply related
data elements to each item. This coding is based
upon information that is already known about the item
such as SM&R coding, essentiality, or drawing
characteristics. Examples of such data elements
include cognizance symbol. Federal Supply Class
(FSC) , Acquisition Advice Code, and item management
coding (which indicates if the inventory management
of the item should be retained or passed onto the
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) )
.
(5) Packaging and Preservation. At this point the tasks
of the provisioner are completed and the provisioning
project is electronically forwarded for packaging
assignments. Packaging and preservation codes are
used for determining shipping requirements and
preservation techniques applicable to the class of
item.
(6) Files Load. This is the process where all of the
information is actually loaded onto the Weapons
System File. The skeletonized record in the form of
PTD now includes item identification through the
Defense Logistics Services Center (DLSC) , technical
11
coding via the HSC engineering activity, and supply
and packaging data. On a weekly basis a batch
program is run which generates a Files Load
Transaction Tape. On this tape are actions to load
the CIO Files, the Master Data File (MDF)
, the
Program Support Interest File (PSI) , the Technical
Reference File (TRF) , the Weapons System File (APL
Line Item Data) , the Component Characteristics File
(APL Header Data) , and the Master Allowance Parts




(7) Generation of Computations. Once the files have been
loaded, the provisioning project is ready for the
final step, which is computation of requirements.
SPS itself does not perform these computations;
however it does initiate the process. The
provisioner loaded the necessary data up front to
build what is called a computation header. This
computation header will trigger requirements
determination by passing to the Mechanized Program
the needed project and equipment level data. The
header information identifies what type of
computations are desired, the allowance model to be
used, equipment population and support dates.
(8) Provisionincf Procurement and APL Generation. After
the requirements for allowances and system stock have
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been mechanically computed, the results are passed
onto the provisioner for review. The provisioner
revises the allowance quantities as required. Once
done, the project is released to generate procurement
requests (PRs) , Planned Program Requirements (PPRs)
,
Supply Support Requests (SSRs) , and cataloging
requests for all new ICP managed items. A hard copy
APL can then be requested for quality review prior to
fleet distribution.
The figure in Appendix E depicts graphically the
provisioning process. As one can see, it is circuitous in
nature. Modifications to the equipment's baseline
configuration will result in a reprovisioning effort to
bring the APL back into agreement with the equipment make-
up.
C. MAJOR PROVISIONING CONCERNS
The final APL and its associated supply support posture
brought to fruition in the provisioning process is a result
of advance planning on behalf of the Integrated Logistics
Manager of the Hardware Systems Command procuring the
equipment.
Provisioning can theoretically be (and sadly, in fact
actually is) sometimes accomplished with the barest of
information. The consequence is reduced supply support for
the life of the equipment. Logistics managers have general
guiding doctrine concerning the level of detailed PTD
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required for their program. Unfortunately, the current
trend is to require the minimal level from the contractor in
order to reduce the logistics cost of their respective
programs. Many logistics managers consider logistics
something to cut to the minimal level because it does not
materially benefit the program. Additionally, program
managers tend to focus on the up-front costs of developing
and funding a program, and they often neglect funding
requirements for logistics support. Logistics managers must
ensure that logistics elements receive the correct level of
interest and funding.
Provisioners have difficulty in the transition between
the various provisioning military standards, since each one
calls out different, unique requirements from the submitting
contractor. With the number of contractors and the
continuing procurement of equipments by the HSCs, it is not
surprising to sometimes have the same contractor providing
provisioning information to satisfy two different
provisioning requirements. Since provisioners are
interested in establishing an accurate and complete database
in the CIO files (MDF/PSI/TRF)
,
they wish to load as much
technical documentation as possible for each item on an APL.
The determination of provisioning requirements is very
loosely controlled by the HSCs. This inconsistency results
in some programs having more technical data than required
for provisioning, while leaving other programs with marginal
14
data. Appendix F lists those documents currently required
by the HSCs for equipment provisioning.
The delivery of data is also a major concern with
provisioners. "Ordinarily level 2 engineering data are
required to be delivered with military systems at
provisioning. Often, level 1 data are furnished." [Ref.
6:p. 2-8] Level 2 data contain detail and arrangement
drawings necessary for adequate provisioning of the
equipment. Level 1 data contain minimal arrangement
information which generally is not adequate for
provisioning. The current trend is to procure level 3
drawings. Level 3 drawings coupled with Type C product
specifications, [Ref. 7:p. 2-5]:
contain all the information needed for competitive
reprocurement. [They] . . . provide engineering data for
quality production of an end item of equipment and for
competitive reprocurement of spare parts substantially
identical to the original item.
With only the minimal technical data provided with the
provisioning, an ICP has a difficult time completing the
appropriate level of provisioning. Additionally, when
technical data are not provided at the time of provisioning,
the chances of procuring it later from the contractor is
marginal. If a vendor goes out of business, it may never be
possible to obtain the data at a later time. And the longer
the period from provisioning, the lesser the chance of
procuring the technical data. [Ref. 6:p. 2-14]
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The problem with technical data and provisioning was one
of the findings of a Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)
procurement study. The DLA study group found that [Ref.
6:p. 2-14]:
, . . the Government is not seizing the initiative to
require and diligently monitor contractor delivery of
complete and adequate technical data at provisioning.
Provisioning is virtually the only time a commercial
producer or vendor may ever deliver data, yet too often
the Government does not take the opportunity to acquire
the data.
D THE BREAKOUT PROCESS
The breakout process can be broken down into two major
thrusts: (1) limited screen breakout actions, and (2) full-
screen breakout actions. The object is the same between the
two types of actions, however there is a difference in the
time available to perform the technical breakout review.
Full screen review actions are completed when reprocuring
replenishment parts for the supply system. The
Stratification program used for ICP spares budget
formulation is the starting point for full screen candidate
identification. Since the replenishment procurements are
for future needs and not current backorders, a longer
breakout process can be used Limited screen breakout is
used for currently pending procurements which cannot be
delayed without bringing on negative customer material
impact. Therefore, a shorter review process is initiated.
16
1. The Full Screen Breakout Process
The full screening process involves 65 steps in a






(5) Economic Evaluation; and
(6) Supply Feedback.
The complete 65 step process is detailed in Appendix G. As
one can see, it is a rather complicated affair, and the
review process does tend to slow down repair part
reprocurement action. An explanation of the work involved
in each of the six phases seems appropriate at this time.
a. Data Collection
During this phase all available technical,
contract and identifying data are collected and a file is
established for the item. Pertinent information includes
cataloging and standardization information, contracting
history, identification of the design control activity and
the cognizant engineering activity, the expected life of the
item, and collecting of existing drawings. Data collection
is accomplished in step 1, as illustrated in Appendix G.
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b. Data Evaluation
Data evaluation is the most critical process in
the whole breakout procedure. It involves determination of
the adequacy of the data and the Government's right to use
the data for reprocurement action. Data evaluation is
separated into two stages [Ref. l:p. S6-303.2]:
(i) A brief but intensive analysis of available data
and documents regarding both technical matters and
data rights, leading to a decision whether to
proceed with screening; and
(ii) If the decision is to proceed with screening,
further work necessary to produce an adequate
technical data package, such as research of
contract provisions, engineering work on drawings,
and requests to contractors for additional data.
If the government cannot obtain the requisite technical
data, the item is dropped from further breakout
consideration. Data evaluation is accomplished in steps 2-
14, as illustrated in Appendix G.
c. Data Completion
The data completion phase is concerned with
acquiring or developing the missing technical data. In this
phase, items will belong to one of four categories:
(1) Items where the data package is complete and adequate
for unlimited Government use;
(2) Items where the Government possesses full rights to
use the data but some of the data are missing;
(3) Items where the data package is complete, but the
Government does not possess full rights to use the
data ; and
(4) Items where neither the data package nor the rights
of the Government are adequately established.
18
The object of this phase is to establish the adequacy of the
data and the Government's right to use the data, or to
eliminate the item from further breakout review. Steps 15-
21 of Appendix G illustrate the data completion phase.
d. Technical Evaluation
The purposes of the technical evaluation phase
are [Ref. l:p. S6-303.4]:
. . . to determine the development status, design
stability, high performance, and/or critical
characteristics such as safety of personnel and
equipment; the reliability and effective operation of the
system and equipment in which the parts are to be used;
and to exercise technical judgement as to the feasibility
of breaking out the parts.
The result of the technical review could be the elimination
of further breakout consideration via assignment of one of
three AMC codes at this junction:
(1) AMC K: Parts are produced from Class lA Castings and
similar type forgings and approved source control is
required.
(2) AMC M: Parts are produced from master or coordinated
tooling, e.g., numerically controlled tapes and
master tooling is required for production.
(3) AMC N: Parts require special test and/or inspection
facilities to determine and maintain ultra-precision
quality for the function or system integrity.
Even though these three codes indicate that
limited breakout potential exists, the Defense Acquisition
Regulations (DAR) Supplement No. 6 states [Ref. l:p. S6-
303.4]
:
Certain manufacturing conditions may reduce the field of
potential sources. However . these conditions do not
19
justify the restriction of competition by the assignment
of restrictive AMC's. . . .
The DAR goes on to say that other firms can produce type lA
castings or they can obtain them from approved sources; that
master tooling can be reproduced; and that adequate
inspection and testing facilities may be available at other
firms. The object is not to reduce breakout efforts merely
on the grounds of an AMC assignment. However, the current
economic analysis model rejects any item from breakout
consideration if it he s one of these restrictive AMC codes.
Design stability of the item must also be
considered. Screening on parts that are anticipated to
undergo a design change should be deferred until the design
is stable. Several other considerations deal with
qualification testing, quality assurance procedures, and new
source approval/acceptance. Steps 22-37 of Appendix G
illustrate the technical evaluation phase of breakout,
e. Economic Evaluation Phase
Economic evaluation cuts to the heart of the
breakout decision. The object is simply to identify and
estimate the breakout savings and the direct cost offsets to
breakout. It is composed of five segments [Ref. l:p. S6-
303.5]
:
(1) Development of breakout savings by determining the
remaining program life of an item and multiplying by
the 25% savings factor.
(2) Computation of breakout costs by collecting,
summarizing and comparing the following costs:
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(a) Direct costs which includes all expenditures
which are direct and wholly identifiable to
a specific, successful breakout action, and
which are not reflected in the unit price.
These include Government tooling or special
test equipment, qualification testing,
quality control expenses, and industry
specific costs not otherwise borne by the
Government
.
(b) Performance specification costs which are
applicable if the item is constructed to a
performance specification. These costs
would include additional cataloging costs,
additional bin opening costs, additional
management costs, additional technical data
costs, and additional repair part and test
equipment costs.
(3) Comparison of estimated savings to the anticipated
breakout costs, and if the costs are greater then the
savings, breakout is foregone.
The economic evaluation phase is difficult to adequately
determine since a specific algorithm for computing costs and
savings was not included in the original DAR legislation,
nor has it been addressed in later updates (i.e., the
Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS).)
This has resulted in each service determining a different
version for their own uses. Steps 38-56 of Appendix G,
illustrate the economic evaluation phase of breakout.
f. Supply Feedback Phase
This phase is the final screening for breakout
parts. This phase is completed for all AMC 2 parts to
determine if enough leadtime exists to breakout an item for
the immediate buy requirement. It is illustrated by steps
57-65 in Appendix G.
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The breakout program looks to the full screen
review process to accomplish the bulk of the breakout
action. The tradeoff is an expanded leadtime resulting from
the technical reviews. Though these reviews should not
impact supply support, there is the possibility of delaying
budget execution due to the extra time necessary. The
possibility of this is slight and, when viewed against the
cost avoidances associated with breakout, the researcher
views them to be negligible.
2 . The Limited Screen Breakout Process
The second breakout procedure is a limited version
of the full screen process and covers only the essential
technical evaluations. The limited screen breakout process
is constrained to 21 days, verses the maximum of up to one
full year for a full screen breakout effort. [Ref. 8]
Limited screen procedures are appropriate when the full
screening process cannot be completed for a part in
sufficient time to support an immediate buy requirement,
[Ref l:p. S6-304] Candidates for limited screen breakout
are a result of weekly runs of UICP application A/0 BIO,
Supply Demand Review (SDR) . SDR determines those items
which require procurement action within the apportionment
year in order to support obligation.
The abbreviated format has 11 steps as compared to
the 65 associated with the full screen process. The steps
are followed sequentially and if a negative answer is
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applicable to any of the questions, then the breakout review
is terminated for the buy in question. However, once the
urgent requirement has been met, a full screen review is
accomplished on the item.




Assemble the available data.












Is a satisfactory part now being produced?
(6) Step 6. Can the part be procured from a new source
without qualification or other critical
approval/testing?
(7) Step 7 Can the Government or a new source be
responsible for quality assurance?
(8) Step 8 Can the part be manufactured without master
or coordinated tooling or special testing equipment?
(9) Step 9 If the answer to all of these questions is
YES, then assign an AMC 2, and breakout the item on
the pending procurement. Do not proceed with steps
10 and 11.
(10) Step 10. If the answer is NO to any of these
questions, assign an AMC of 3,4, or 5 as
appropriate.
(11) Step 11. Finally, establish a date for future
review of the AMC 3,4, or 5 item, in an attempt to
complete a full screen breakout.
Appendix H contains the limited screen decision
breakout summary process.
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The ultimate goal of the breakout review process is
improvement in the acquisition method of an item. In
general, breakout review actions will continue for an item
until it is given an AMC/AMSC combination IG, 2G , IK, 2K,
IM, 2M, IN, 2N, IT or 2T. [Ref. l:p. S6-203] An explanation
of these combinations are contained in Appendix I.
E. TECHNICAL REVIEW PROCESS
The breakout technical review process, though similar in
nature between the two ICPs, differs ir fcactice at SPCC and
ASO. This is the result of the level of breakout authority
granted the two ICPs by their respective HSCs. NAVSEA, who
does most of its business with SPCC, retains all breakout
authority. NAVAIR and ASO have a more open working
relationship, in that NAVAIR authorizes ASO to complete
breakout action on 9 0% of the items managed by ASO without
HSC approval.
1. The SPCC Technical Review Process
The breakout review effort at SPCC amounts to the
candidate selection process. The output of the
Stratification process is matched against a local FOCUS file
containing the non-recurring demand requirements. This
ensures that both recurring and non-recurring demand have
been included in the listing of breakout candidates. This
file is then scrubbed of all items which are not breakout
worthy (i.e. items that are terminal, items transferring to
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DLA management, items which are obsolete, combinations of
family related items, etc.)«
After this is completed, a final listing is
generated and sorted by the appropriate ISEA, which will
complete the actual breakout review. The various HSCs have
prenegotiated annual breakout review package goals for each
of their ISEAs. The overall success rate at SPCC is based
on the cumulative success rates of the individual ISEAs.
The SPCC annual goal for FY 1987 was 10,500 packages. [Ref.
9:p. IV-38]
Appendix L lists the FY 1987 breakout goals and
completions by ISEA. The number of packages provided to the
ISEA is significantly larger than the actual review goal.
This allows the ISEA to choose which packages to review.
[Ref. 10] While allowing the ISEAs flexibility in the
scheduling of their workloads, this process could result in
important breakout items being ignored from year to year.
SPCC breakout packages provided to the various ISEA
include a breakout worksheet, several WSF retrievals (which
contains necessary management data) , and the required
drawing package. The ISEA reviews the packages, performs an
analysis, and returns the results of the review to SPCC. In
most cases this is the last word on the breakout analysis.
[Ref. 11] If the input data subsequently change
significantly, then the package can be resubmitted to the
ISEA for another screening.
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The ISEA reviews increase the unit cost per breakout
package because the expensive engineering review cost is
applied to every item. If it were eliminated or reduced,
then more candidates could be broken out.
2 . The ASO Technical Review Process
The breakout review effort at ASO is a more balanced
approach. Since NAVAIR authorizes ASO to breakout 9 0% of
their items without a HSC review, ASO is able to breakout
more items and at a lessor unit cost. The expensive HSC
review cost is applied to only a small percentage of the
breakout candidates and, when spread over the complete range
of items, it only minimally increases the breakout review
costs.
The ASO breakout goal for FY 1987 was to complete
12,500 screening actions. [Ref. 12 :p. III-l] ASO uses a
similar process for matching the Stratification output
against a local breakout file in order to generate a clean
listing. This listing is then reviewed and those items
which appear to be the most promising candidates are
processed for breakout review [Ref. 8] ASO uses the
philosophy of [Ref. 12:p. II-3]:
. . . prioritization for screening [which] emphasizes high
ABV, high buy quantities, and parts which can be purchased
quickly.
Since it has in-house engineering talent, ASO has a freer
choice of which items to pursue in order to satisfy their
26
annual review requirement. As a result ASO has been able to
achieve a 51% success rate in breakout reviews. [Ref. 8]
3 . Contractor Technical Information Coding (CTIC)
Many new equipment acquisition contracts require the
inclusion of MIL-STD-789C ("Contractor Technical Information
Coding of Replenishment Parts") . When called out in the
Contract Data Requirements List (CDRL) , this process
requires the contractor submitting the PTD [Ref. l:p. S6-
400] :
(i.) to exert their best effort to make impartial
technical evaluations using applicable technical data and
the experience of competent personnel, and
(ii.) no costs to the Government will be incurred for
duplicate screening of parts.
The information obtained via the CTIC process will be used
by breakout personnel to determine the correct AMC/AMSC
combination. Contractor recommendations should be
considered as such. "Seldom will industry's contribution to
the screening process enable the Government to assign an AMC
without additional review." [Ref. l:p. S6-302] Appendix M
contains the acceptable contractor assigned technical codes.
The involvement of prime contractors in the breakout
review process has been objected to by the National Tooling
& Machining Association (NTMA) and the Small Business
Administration (SBA) . [Ref. 13:pp. 106, 113] The NTMA and
SEA believe that an incestuous relationship exists between
the big defense contractors and DOD procurement officials
and that the two organizations work together to eliminate
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competition vice fostering more of it. Reducing competition
has a direct impact on the membership of NTMA and SBA
organizations. Efforts are underway to review these claims.
However, no conclusions have yet been reached.
NAVSEA has recently initiated a technical review
process at the NAVSEA Logistics Center in Mechanicsburg,
Pennsylvania to ensure accurate AMC/AMSC assignments during
the initial provisioning process. This review process is
rather simple in nature; a Government activity (NAVSEALOG)
will perform the technical review and item coding which is
currently accomplished by contractors under the CTIC
process. The result will be an improved AMC/AMSC assignment
without the bias described by the NTMA and SBA.
NAVSEALOG will review the technical data
accompanying the PTD package and will supplement it with
data from the SPCC library where necessary. [Ref. 34 :p. 6]
If adequate technical data are lacking then the item will be
coded according (usually as noncompetitive.) Efforts to
locate the missing technical data will not be included as
part of this NAVSEA effort. [Ref. 35]
NAVSEALOG has determined that it will be more cost
effective to complete the AMC/AMSC coding in-house than it
is to require contractors to complete the coding
requirements. [Ref. 35] By having a central Government
activity complete the assignment process, a more consistent
process should also result.
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The only disadvantage in this process is the lack of
data enhancement efforts. NAVSEALOG will work the technical
package as is, but will not strive to improve it for
breakout purposes. This is due to timing conflicts (i.e., a
possible slowdown in provisioning could occur) , and resource
conflicts (i.e., the program is set up to do AMC/AMSC
assignments, not complete breakout packages.)
Even as it is currently designed this program will
improve the accuracy of AMC/AMSC assignments, however it
should also be enlarged to include data enhancement
measures.
F. MAJOR BREAKOUT CONCERNS
1. Technical Data
In March 1983, the Deputy Secretary of Defense sent
a memorandum to the Service Secretaries pointing out that
the lack of technical data to support reprocurement from
other than existing sources, is the principal factor
inhibiting breakout. [Ref. 16] Technical data problems
accounted for 62% of the breakout failures in fiscal year
198 6. [Ref. 2: p. 13] Problems encountered with data
include proprietary restrictions, inadequate data, lack of
data due to nonprocurement during system acquisition, and
data missing from data repositories. ASO reports additional
problems with missing acceptance test requirements, missing
master artwork and missing mylars (used for determining
correct turbine blading pitch/design/thicknesses.) [Ref. 8]
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Reverse engineering and bailment are two methods
which can be used to counter this lack of technical data,
but due to the expense involved, these methods are not
universal cure-alls. Reverse engineering is the process by
which parts are examined and analyzed to determine how they
are manufactured, for the purposes of developing a complete
technical data package including Level 3 drawings.
A related area which causes concern is the cost of
procuring data, especially when related to a major system
acquisition. Little research has been done to establish the
intrinsic value of technical data, therefore one is left in
a "seller's market" when determining the adequacy of
technical data costs. [Ref, 17:p. 1]
A second technical data issue relates to timing and
receipt of technical data. A recent General Accounting
Office (GAO) report indicated that the DOD was paying for
data that it had ordered but, in fact, had not received.
[Ref. 18 :p. 1] This problem is a result of the confusion
during contract initiation and review. The first problem
deals with the contract data requirements being included in
all of the appropriate levels of the contract (i.e., has the
correct Data Item Description (DID) been called out, and is
the data requirement specified in the CDRL. ) Also of
importance is the timing called out for the delivery of data
procured in the contract. A common practice associated with
equipment turnover is to require delivery of technical data
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in concert with the delivery of the end item itself. This
practice will usually result in delivery of accurate
technical data, however it delays component provisioning and
other required logistics activities.
A final technical data issue is the acceptance
review of data that are received by the services. In many
cases technical data are received and manually stored with
only a cursory review for legibility. The true test for
adequacy for use may not come for several years when the
technical data are retrieved and reviewed for use in
conjunction with a reprocurement action. [Ref. 18: p. 39]
At this time it is too late to correct the problem by
requiring the contractor to develop new data.
2. NAVSUP Breakout Goals
A second concern in breakout is the measure of
effectiveness currently used by NAVSUP to determine the
success of the program. The Navy breakout program is
currently working under DOD established competitive goals.
NAVSUP has established the goal of 42% competition for the
ICP's items. (This means that 42% of all procurement
actions will be competitive versus sole-source.) Percentage
goals as a measure of effectiveness can be considered
useful, however the dollar value of contracts awarded
competitively is a better measure of effectiveness.
Additionally, in a practical sense, the average citizen can
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relate to an annual dollar value for competitive savings
more than a percentage of contracts awarded.
Another measure by which the ICPs are graded is the
meeting of material obligations. This relates to obligating
the material budget for spares procurement on time. Over
the last few years it has been increasingly more difficult
to simultaneously meet both the competitive percent goal and
the budget obligation schedule.
Since breakout is a major driver in the competition
process, the impact of which measure of effectiveness to use
is an important consideration.
G. ANNUAL BUY VALUE (ABV)
The DAR Supplement No. 6 set the threshold of $10,000 as
the cutoff for breakout review action. The Supplement
estimated that this figure represented the average cost to
breakout an item. Therefore, any item with a lessor ABV
would not be cost effective to pursue as a breakout
candidate. [Annual Buy Value is the product of an item's
unit procurement price and its forecasted annual demand
quantity.
]
The current Navy breakout method is tied to the
Stratification process for the generation of potential
breakout candidates. Using the UICP application A/0 B2 0, a
listing of all procurement buys for the budget year is
generated. This is matched with a local FOCUS file to
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create a computer listing of all ICP cognizance items having
an ABV greater than $10,000.
If an item has an ABV greater than $10,000, then it is a
prime candidate for breakout consideration. Those items
will then begin a further review process to determine if
they are breakout potential. This review, which is
automated in nature will screen out those items which are
tenninal, obsolescent, transitioning to DLA management, or
are already in the breakout pipeline without resolution yet.
The screening action also ensures that non-recurring demand
is added to recurring demand, to ensure that all planned
program requirements are included in the ABV figures. [Ref.
11]
Since ABV is supposed to be the break-even point between
the expected demand for an item, expressed as its annual
value for procurement purposes, and the cost of the level of
effort necessary to break out the item, the value at which
it is set is crucial to determining which items are broken
out. A better approach might be to eliminate the DOD ABV
threshold, and determine a new level where breakout is cost-
effective on a system basis.
In Fiscal Year 1987, NAVSUP lowered the ABV figure to
$5,000 for the two ICPs. The Fleet Material Support Office
(FMSO) completed a study which illustrates that the break
point for Navy management should be altered. The FMSO study
indicated that the ABV for SPCC should be set at $6,840 and
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that the ABV for ASO should be set at $5,800. The
difference in the two values is due to:
(1) A higher engineering review cost for the
NAVSEA/SPAWAR material, managed by SPCC; [Ref. 19 :p.
4]
(2) A higher breakout success rate for aviation spares
managed by ASO (60% success for aviation spares,
vice 34% for non-aviation spares) ; and
(3) A lower labor rate for aviation spares. [Ref. 20 :p.
1]
The methodology used by FMSO was an iterative process of
setting values for three parameters (labor costs,
differential costs between competition and sole-source
procurements, and First Article Testing costs), and then
varying these parameters with different breakout success
rates and different discount rates. [Ref. 19 :p. 6] The
process is one which can be readily used for conducting
sensitivity analysis, given a range of possible input
parameters. [Ref. 21]
The Air Force uses a very different approach to
determine their ABV thresholds The Air Force ABV can be
determined by one of three different methods, all of which
tend to generate the same value. Appendix J details the Air
Force approach to ABV determination.
Due to different input parameters and breakout review
philosophies, the Air Force has as a drastically lower ABV
than those given above for the Navy; namely $2,13 0.
The major difference is due to the Air Force not
including all of the breakout costs in their figures; just
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the costs associated with that specific Air Force ICP. The
situation would be similar if the Navy ICPs did not include
the HSCs reviewing costs as part of their respective
breakout figures.
Recomputed Navy ABV thresholds using the Air Force
methodology for the ICP's part are [Ref. 22:p. 1]:
ICP CURRENT ABV NEW ABV WITH AF MODEL
ASO $5,800 $6,367
SPCC $6,840 $3,519
The Air Force model results in a higher ABV for ASO and a
lower ABV for SPCC due to the HSC review cost differential.
Appendix K includes the computations for ABV using the Air




There is movement afoot to eliminate the DAR Supplement
No. 6 determined ABV threshold completely, and allow each
service to set the ABV at their respective ICPs. This would
allow each service to set their own ABV based upon the
unique breakout costs associated with each ICP. DOD has
recently allowed the services to operate with independently
set ABV values. This is a means to allow the services to
determine and operate at their most economical level. To




This chapter discussed the provisioning and breakout
processes currently used within the Navy. Provisioning is
concerned with the identification of the subcomponents of a
piece of equipment, such that an adequate range and depth of
spares can be determined and procured. Breakout is
concerned with the identification of the actual manufacturer
or a second manufacturer of an item, such that price
reductions can result on item reprocurements . An underlying
requirement in both of these programs is the availability of
adequate technical data. This concern was discussed as it
applied to the two programs mentioned above.
Within the breakout process the limited screening and
the full screening procedures were discussed, as was the
annual buy value criteria used to determine breakout
candidates. The technical data review process used for both
provisioning and breakout was also covered. Finally,
several major concerns with both of these processes were
discussed.
In the following chapter, several breakout review models
will be presented which try to quantify the costs associated
with breakout. A uniform breakout model will be presented
as an option to the currently used models within DOD. In
Chapter IV, several of the major breakout and provisioning




In this chapter, three breakout models used by various
DOD components will be reviewed and analyzed. The three
models discussed include two Air Force models, ("The Compet-
tive Acquisition and Breakout of Spares Model (CABS)" and
the "Modern Technologies Model") , and a Navy model ("The
NAVSEA Logistics Center Model") . The Army has not been
active in the development of their own models, however
research indicates that they are actively using the CABS
model
.
A new model is then proposed, called the "NAVICP
Breakout Model." This model is a combination of the best
features of the other models while providing a methodology
which can be easily implemented by the practitioner at a
Navy Inventory Control Point (ICP) . This chapter concludes
with a discussion of the proposed model.
A. THE CURRENT MODEL
The current "model" for breakout candidate determination
comes from the economic analysis section of the DAR
Supplement No. 6. The Supplement details several guidelines
to consider in determining breakout candidates, but it does
not provide a specific algorithm to follow. The procedure
states simply that a comparison of breakout costs and
estimated breakout savings is to be completed. If the costs
outweigh the savings then the item should not be considered
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as a breakout candidate; if the savings are greater then the
breakout cost, then pursue the item until breakout is
achieved. [Ref. l:p. S6-303.5]
Costs are broken into two elements; direct costs and
costs associated with the development of a performance
specification. Direct costs are defined as those [Ref. l:p
S6-303.5]
:
expenditures which are direct and wholly identifiable to a
specific breakout action, and which are not reflected in
the part unit price. Examples of direct costs include
Government tooling or special test equipment,
qualification testing, quality control expenses, and
industry participation costs (such as completion of the
Contractor Technical Information Data Record) if borne by
the Government.
In the majority of cases, the only costs associated with
breakout are those which fall into the direct cost category.
Performance specification costs are only associated with
items for which the Government decides that it is
advantageous to develop a perfonnance specification, vice
retain the item under a design specification. This is
equivalent to a form, fit and function design. If the
performance specification route is taken, a new item of
supply may result which would require some type of
additional p"^cvisioning action, cataloging action, and
management cost associated with handling and procuring the
newly introduced item. Thus, the costs associated with
performance specification breakout may or may not be
recurring. If a complete technical data package including
Level III drawings were developed, then the costs would be
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non-recurring. If a decision was made not to procure the
technical data, then the performance specification costs
could be recurring. In the latter case one may receive an
item which has different repair parts and would have to be
provisioned as a new item of supply when it is delivered to
the Navy.
Breakout savings are determined by finding the product
of the local savings factor (2 5% is the accepted DOD figure,
but a local figure can be used if it is justified) and the
remaining program or service life buy value for a part if it
were broken out.
The original Navy breakout cost model (a result of the
1986 FMSO study mentioned in Chapter II) identified only
three costs associated with breakout actions. These costs
include a labor cost to review the breakout items, a First
Article Testing (FAT) cost, and a procurement order cost
defined as the difference between a sealed bid versus a
negotiated buy. [Ref. 19: p. 2] In the FMSO study, labor
costs were derived from the previous fiscal year labor
rates; FAT costs were derived from estimates by the ICPs;
and the order cost differential was derived by comparing the
values from the Levels computations (UICP A/0 DOl) between
negotiated procurement order costs and the sealed bid order
costs.
The FMSO study assumed a five-year remaining service
life, applied a 10% discount factor for the cost of money
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over the five-year period as prescribed by DOD directives,
and also included a 10% obsolescence factor for items
leaving the inventory. The results of the study provided a
range of values which could be considered as the ABV for the
two Navy ICPs. The ranges were an ABV of $5,478 to $7,3 24
for ASO; and $8,806 to $12,999 for SPCC. The disparity
between these proposed ABV figures reflects directly on the
labor costs associated with breakout at the two ICPs. In
particular, the HSCs have set rules on the final authority
to determine a breakout item. SPCC must submit all breakout
actions to the HSC (NAVSEA or SPAWAR) for their respective
reviews prior to an item being broken out. This review
increased the labor costs almost twelve-fold for SPCC
cognizance items. ASO has the final breakout authority on
approximately 90% of the items that it manages. Only flight
critical items must be forwarded to the HSC (NAVAIR) for
final review.
The labor costs used in the FMSO study follow:
TCP ICP COST HSC COST TOTAL COST COST/ITEM
ASO $7,061,679 $ 459,910 $ 7,521,589 $1,176
SPCC $1,249,655 $13,307,720 $14,557,375 $3,373
As is obvious from above, the HSC review costs dominate the
SPCC labor costs.
A second FMSO study, conducted six months later in 1987,
revised these ABV thresholds down to a range of $7,100 to
$10,500 for SPCC and $5,591 to $6,957 for ASO. [Ref. 20:p.
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5] These lower figures were attributed to a learning curve
effect in the second year of breakout review, and to lower
labor rates experienced at the ICPs. However, the two Navy
ICPs are still operating under an ABV threshold of $5,000,
mandated by NAVSUP for fiscal year 1987.
B. THE COMPETITIVE ACQUISITION AND BREAKOUT OF SPARES MODEL
The CABS model was developed in 1983 by Analytics of
Dayton, Ohio, as a result of an Air Force contract. The
study separated the costs involved in breakout into the
following three categories [Ref. 23:p. 22]:
(1) Government non-recurring costs to break out a spare.
(2) Government recurring costs to break out a spare.
(3) Contractor non-recurring costs to become new source
(to be applied only if identified and charged
directly to the Government.)
The CABS model follows the basic logic:
Net Savings = (historical percentage of savings) x
(remaining program life buy value) -
(summation of non-recurring and recurring
costs associated with breakout)
The mathematical expression for the model and the
definitions of its elements are listed in Table III-l. This
model is an improvement over the DAR model in that it tries
to quantify risks associated with contractor nonperformance.
It also encompasses many of the specific breakout costs.
The CABS model has several drawbacks. It excludes a
present-value analysis of the costs and benefits. It does
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TABLE III-l
THE COMPETITIVE ACQUISITION AND BREAKOUT OF SPARES MODEL
(CABS) [Ref. 28:p. 7-3]
7 8 3 5
Savings (G) = (Sgst) (^l) " [ ^ ^i + [ Zj + j; U^ + j; NV^^]
i=l j=i k=l m=l
Sest = estimated savings from breakout value ($/$-year)
Costs Definitions
Xi = remaining expected program life-time buy quantity
at current unit price ($)
Y^ = cost of special tooling (Government transhipment)
($)
Y^ = new source qualification ($)
Y3 = reverse engineering ($)
Y4 = initial data package verification ($)
Y5 = purchase of data rights ($)
Yg = purchase of procurement data package ($)
Y7 = First Article Test and inspection ($)
\Jl = production and test facilities billed to Government
($)
U2 = qualification testing billed to Government ($)
U3 = special tooling billed to the Government ($)
N = number of nonstandard parts in a new performance
specification item (N = for design specification)
Vl = variable cataloging for nonstandard parts ($)
V2 = bid opening for nonstandard parts ($)
V3 = management for nonstandard parts ($)
V4 = technical data for nonstandard parts ($)
V5 = additional repair part and test equipment for
nonstandard parts ($)
Z]^ = technical assistance ($)
Z2 = product assurance ($)
Z3 = risk of nonperformance ($)
Z4 = risk of time-delay ($)
Z5 = update and distribution of data packages ($)
Zg = data package verification ($)
Z7 = solicitation preparation and evaluation ($)
Z3 = contract administration and termination ($)
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not address item obsolescence. Finally, it requires the
quantification of a great many factors, most of which are
"soft." [Ref. 23 :p. 22] The model is tedious to use at
the piece part level.
The cost model may be useful when applied to a major
component, but it is not very useful for analysis of
breakout candidates. Additionally, the CABS model does not
include the noneconomic benefits of breakout. It also
ignores the potential for innovation resulting from
competition, the need for a broader industrial base and the
potential contribution to achievement of established
competitive procurement goals. [Ref. 24: p. 27]
C. THE MODERN TECHNOLOGIES MODEL
The Air Force Business Research Management Center at
Wright-Patterson AFB contracted with Modern Technologies,
Inc. to develop a model which quantifies breakout and
competition costs. The results were published in March of
1987.
As a consequence of the study, Modern Technologies noted
that "a fundamental element of the problem lies in the
unpredictable nature and magnitude of the savings and costs
involved with competition initiatives on a specific part."
[Ref. 25: p. 4] As a consequence. Modern Technologies tried
to combine costs of competition with costs of breakout. The
Modern Technologies model therefore assumed five major
elements of breakout [Ref. 25:p. 12]:
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(1) Estimated savings over the expected remaining service
life.
(2) Government non-recurring costs for breakout to direct
purchase.
(3) Government recurring costs for breakout to direct
purchase.
(4) Government non-recurring costs for breakout to
competition.
(5) Government recurring costs for breakout for
competition.
The structure of the Modern Technologies model follows
[Ref . 25:p 13]
:
S = PXT -U-V-W-YT-ZT
where
:
S = Expected reduction in cost ($)
P = Expected percentage annual savings
(%/year)
X = Annual program buy value at current
price ($)
T = Remaining annual program life of the part
(years)
U = Non-recurring cost for breakout ($)
V = Costs associated with competition based
on a performance specification ($)
W = Non-recurring cost for competition ($)
Y = Recurring cost for breakout ($/year)
Z = Recurring cost for competition ($/year)
In this general structure, the following decision rules
apply:
(1) If S > 0, then compete the item;
(2) If S < 0, and PXT > (U + YT) , then breakout item;
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(3) If S < 0, and PXT < (U + YT) , then continue sole
source procurement.
The mathematical expression and the definitions for the
Modern Technologies model appear in Table III-2.
The Modern Technologies model is similar to the CABS
model in regard to the data element definitions. In fact it
could be argued that the two models are mirror images, but
with a different numbering/lettering scheme. However, there
is a difference between the two models. The Modern
Technologies model includes a specific factor for non-
recurring breakout costs, whereas the CABS model includes
them as part of the base factors. The model also does not
adequately resolve the issue of discounting of savings and
benefits. The use of present value analysis, as required by
DOD directives, is not evident in the Modern Technologies
model
.
The Modern Technologies model was designed for the Air
Force to use at their Air Force Logistics Commands (AFLCs)
.
Many of the elements specified by the model can easily be
quantified at all of the AFLCs. Application of this model
to Navy ICP use would be difficult because the Navy ICPs are
not able to quantify some of the data elements in the model
or to differentiate certain cost elements between breakout
and nonbreakout situations. In addition, costs associated
with purchase request generation, contract award, preaward
survey, solicitation set preparation, bid opening, technical
assistance, contract administration, additional bid
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P = expected percentage reduction in cost ($/$-year)
X = annual program buy value at current price ($)
T = remaining anrual program life of the part (years)
U = non-recurring cost for breakout ($)
N = number of nonstandard parts resulting from
performance specification (units)
V^ = item entry for nonstandard part ($)
V2 = management of nonstandard part ($)
V3 = technical data for nonstandard part ($)
V4 = repair tools and test equipment for nonstandard
part ($)
W]^ = data package review and verification ($)
W2 = data rights purchase ($)
W3 = data package purchase ($)
W4 = First Article Test and inspection ($)
W5 = qualification test billed to the Government ($)
Wg = reverse engineering ($)
Y^ = purchase request preparation ($)
Y2 = contract award ($)
Zq^ = special tooling transhipment ($)
Z2 = source approval ($)
Z3 = source development ($)
Z4 = solicitation sets ($)
Z5 = additional bid evaluation ($)
Zg = pre-award surveys ($)
Z7 = technical assistance ($)
Z3 = contract administration ($)
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evaluation, and source development do not clearly seem
appropriate for inclusion in a breakout model. These costs
impact enhancement of competition, but should not be
considered when determining breakout candidate selection.
D. THE NAVSEA LOGISTICS CENTER (NAVSEALOG) MODEL
The NAVSEA Logistics Center (NAVSEALOG) in
Mechanicsburg, PA has developed a model for use in the
economic evaluation of breakout items for which they are the
In-Service Engineering Activity (ISEA) . The process
involves the use of a breakout worksheet and is rather
involved in its completion. Table III-3 details the
equations used by NAVSEALOG to determine the breakout
savings associated with the life cycle of an item. The
NAVSEALOG model considers six cost elements in determining
breakout costs. These are [Ref. 26:p. 5-6]:
(1) Visual and dimensional analysis which result in an
adequate technical data package (TDP) ; assumes
values ranging from $150 to $7000 depending on
item complexity.
(2) Drawing development costs required to develop the
TDP; assumes a value of $7 00 per drawing.
(3) Material determination required to identify
material composition and mechanical properties of
the item; assumes a value of $250 per component as
guide.
(4) Test specification determination to develop the
performance parameters, acceptance criteria and
test procedures for an item; assumes values
ranging from $500 to $15,000 depending on the
complexity of the item.
(5) Possible item destruction if an item must be dis-
assembled during reverse engineering in the
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TABLE III-3
THE NAVSEALOGCEN BREAKOUT MODEL
[Ref. 17:p. 5-2]
S = p(LCE3_ - RAV)
RAV = TRFI(LCEi/Ni) + TNRFI (LCE2/N2
)
TRFI = OHi + DIi - DOi - PR
TNRFI = (OH2 + DI2 - DO2) (RSR)
LCEi = [Ni(Pi) (Fn)] - E
LCE2 = (N2)(P2)(Fn)
E = (3Ni/n) (Pi) (F3)
(1 + i)l + (l+i)2 + ... + (l+i)n
nFn
Ni = [QD - (RSR) (CRA) ], (4) (n)
N2 = (RSR) (CRA) (4) (n)
Cost Definitions
P^ = unit price of the item (DEN B055)
($)
P2 = repair net price (DEN B059) ($)
QD = quarterly system demand forecast
(DEN B074) (units/quarter)
RSR - repair survival rate (DEN F009)
(%/100)
CRA = system random maintenance carcass
return average (DEN B022B)
(units/quarter)
0H]_ = on hand quantity (DEN A012 total)
(units)
DIi = internal due in (DEN A008B total)
(units)
DO^ = internal due out (DEN A021A total)
(units)
PR = total planned requirements (DEN
A014) (units/year)
OH2 = on hand quantity (DEN A012 total








p = savings factor = 0.25 ($/$-year)
i = estimated average inflation rate =
0.0616 devised from last ten years




due in (DEN A008A total)
due out (DEN A021A total)












total number of new units required
over the remaining service life
(units)
estimated total number of carcasses
returned to the supply system over
the remaining service life. (units)
the factor when multiplied by the
price, results in the average price
over n years, adjusted for
inflation.
the expenditures over expected time
(estimated to be 3 years) to develop
breakout item. ($)
the total estimated life cycle
expenditures for total number of new
units required over remaining
service life less the 3 year
competition development period. ($)
the total estimated expenditures for
repaired units returned to the
supply system (used only for
repairable items.) ($)
the total number of uncommitted
"Ready for Issue" assets currently
in the supply system (units)
total number of uncommitted "Not
Ready for Issue" assets in the
supply system, that are expected to










development of a TDP; the value would be the
procurement cost of one item.
(6) Management and logistics costs incurred in the
review and the costs of file and management data
associated with the development of full and open
competition of the item of supply; estimated to be
15 percent of the summation of the above costs.
NAVSEALOG uses visual and dimension analysis, and/or
reverse engineering as methods to produce the required
technical data. The gross breakout costs are then
multiplied by a three-year inflation factor. Finally, the
difference between breakout costs and breakout savings is
determined. Again, if savings are greater, the breakout of
the item should be done.
The NAVSEALOG model takes into account two important
factors missing in the previous models; namely, inflation
and discounting of costs and benefits. Additionally, the
model draws most of its data from existing information
already in the Weapons Systems File (WSF) , rather than
having to derive it from a series of estimates.
NAVSEALOG developed cost element estimates from market
surveys conducted with engineering firms engaged in the data
generation process. [Ref. 27] These costs are based on
categorizing breakout items into one of five complexity
levels, which are assigned to directly equate to the level
of effort required to work the breakout item. The levels of
complexity are associated with generic types of equipments.
For example, the simplest level of complexity, (Level 1)
includes hoses, disks, nuts, tubes, wire; the medium level
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of complexity, (Level 3) includes bearings, labyrinth
packings, clutch shafts and shaft assemblies; and the most
complex level, (Level 5) includes diesel engines,
transmissions, and circuit breakers. [Ref. 26: p. 5-5]
The process could be improved if the categories were
also identified by Federal Supply Class (FSC) or a
combination of group and class. Research from the Air
Force Institute of Technology provides evidence that there
is a statistical relationship between the annual usage rate
of an item and the item category of supply (i.e., the FSC).
[Ref. 28 :p. 53] A ranking of items based on item
classification (i.e., by FSC) would also be useful in
developing general guidelines, which could be used to assist
ICP managers in their determination of whether to proceed
with item breakout. ASO indicates that some such general
guidelines are already being developed for turbine engine
blade sets used on several Navy aircraft. [Ref. 8]
One area of confusion in this model is the Residual
Asset Value (RAV) figure used in the breakout economic life
cycle analysis. In theory, this element would seem
necessary. However, in practice this seems to be a rather
arbitrarily strict application of economic analysis.
NAVSEALOG is trying to balance the breakout costs and
breakout savings over the life of an item. For an adequate
comparison NAVSEALOG has concluded that, at the end of an
item's life, there would be a minimum number of the items
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left over. The greater the amount of material that is on
hand at the end of an item's life cycle, the lesser the
savings value from breakout becomes. The amount of material
left over at the end of an item's life is the function of
the inventory management practices used by the ICP in
managing the item.
RAV then is a function of inventory management
practices. Breakout models are not designed to encompass
inventory management practices. Breakout models instead use
annual demand and item procurement value to determine
breakout candidates; the inventory management policies are
inconsequential to the consideration of breakout candidates.
It is assumed that competent inventory management
practices will be used. These practices include using
regenerated material out of the repair cycle as the prime
source of spares as equipments are transitioned out of DOD;
and also the deduction of procurement buys as demand
decreases at the end of the equipment's life-cycle. When
equipments are transitioned out of DOD, regenerated material
is the prime source for equipments spares, not new
procurements. When considering the phase-out practices of
equipments within DOD, this strict matching principle seems
inappropriate. For this reason the NAVSEALOG RAV figure is
not deemed appropriate.
The NAVSEALOG model is the only one examined so far
which considers planned program requirements (PPRs) as part
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of the annual demand figure. However, the treatment of PPRs
could be improved. The current model looks only to the
currently registered PPRs, and not at the trend of the
requirement for the particular item. Budget constraints
restrict the establishment of PPRs to three years into the
future. The breakout model should take into consideration
the total number of PPRs which will be required, not just
those presently established at the ICP. Future shipbuilding
programs and equipment installation schedules should be
readily available from the HSC program managers and the
complete logistics information can usually be obtained from
the respective program's logistic manager.
E. THE NAVICP BREAKOUT MODEL
1. Model Background
The previously mentioned models indicate the wide
divergence within DOD concerning the breakout process. The
Air Force and the Navy have developed models unique to their
own needs. The wide range of research findings have
revealed the many costs associated with breakout candidate
review. A model which synthesizes the results of this body
of research is developed in this section for application to
the Navy ICPs. The application of this model to other
services is not considered.
After a review of the available literature, the
breakout model for the Navy ICPs should be based on the
NAVSEALOG model. The CABS model includes many cost
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variables, but it does not incorporate the required
discounting factor made necessary due to the time
differences between expenses and the stream of benefits.
Both the CABS model and the Modern Technologies model
encompass a great many cost variables which, for theoretical
purposes, are correct but, for actual uses, are tedious and
difficult to accurately quantify.
Any model chosen to represent breakout costs must be
detailed enough to include all the pertinent factors.
However, it must also be simple enough to be used by the
practitioner. Determining this balance is at the heart of
the model-building process.
2. Model Presentation
The NAVICP Breakout model makes use of the following
major breakout elements:
(1) Estimated savings over the expected remaining service
life.
(2) Government recurring costs to break out an item.
(3) Government non-recurring costs to break out an
item.
Table III-4 presents the mathematical equation and the
definitions of the data elements.
This model contains the same data elements used in
the previous models for the performance design breakout
costs. However, it does eliminate the costs for
competition, which the Modern Technologies model contains.
The fact is that competition does cost more to maintain and,
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TABLE III-4
THE NAVICP BREAKOUT MODEL
7 5
PT - U - ^ Wv. - m I V^




Rl = I Za
Fn
a=l
(l+i)l + (l+i)2 + . . . + (l+i)n
n
N2 = 4n(CRA) (RSR)
K = Ni + Rl - N2
T = KFn
Data Element Definitions:
S = net savings ($)
p = ICP savings factor [DAR allows 0.25; SPCC
actual 0.34; ASO actual 0.60] ($/$-year)
T = total estimated life cycle expenditures for
total number of new units required over the
life of the system ($)
U = non-recurring costs for breakout (SPCC =
$2,174; ASO = $869) ($) [Ref. 8:p. 2]
N]^ = number of recurring demands over the
remaining life time of the item (units)
N2 = number of carcass returns over the life of
the item (repairable only) (units)
R;l = number of non-recurring demands over the life
time of the item (units)
Fn = the factor when multiplied by the price,
results in the average price over n years,
adjusted for inflation
P = unit price [DEN B055] ($)
K = total number of items required over the life
time of an item (units)
m = number of new nonstandard items added as a
result of performance specification breakout
(units)
n = estimated life of the system (years)
[Appendix N]




i = estimated average inflation rate set at
0.0616, devised from last ten years average
of Gross National Product Deflator. [Appendix
N] (%/100)
RSR = repair survival rate [DEN F009] (%/100)
CRA = carcass return average [DEN B022B] (%/100)




V^ = item entry for nonstandard parts ($636.20
for consumable; $1299.53 for repairable)
[Ref. 25:p. 24] ($)
V2 = management cost for nonstandard part ($448.00)
[Ref. 29] ($)
V3 = technical data for nonstandard part ($5325
per package for an average package) [Ref.
30:p. 25] ($)
V4 = technical manual costs for nonstandard item
($500 per equipment) [Ref. 29] ($)
V5 = planned maintenance schedule costs for
nonstandard items ($62.50 per part number)
[Ref. 29] ($)
Breakout Costs [See Appendix N]
W]^ = visual and dimensional analysis ($)
W2 = drawing development ($)
W3 = material identification ($)
W4 = test specification determination ($)
W5 = possible destruction of one item ($)
Wg = technical management cost ($)
W7 = reverse engineering cost ($)
Note: If reverse engineering is used, then the
other breakout costs should be set to zero,
since reverse engineering will provide a
complete technical data package.
Decision Rules: i
If S > 0, Conduct breakout. J




if it is an element of the model, then the decision to
breakout an item would always be negative. For this reason,
costs to continue an item in competition should not be
included in a model to determine breakout candidates.
The NAVICP Breakout model also contains the time
value calculations and breakout cost estimations used in the
NAVSEALOG model. The NAVSEALOG cost estimates are the best
of the previously mentioned models. However, two changes
have been made. The NAVICP Breakout model includes a cost
parameter for reverse engineering (if that method is
expected to be used to obtain the technical data) and it
reduces the value for the technical management review
parameter from 15% to 10% of total breakout cost. This
parameter is reduced, since many of the costs that make up
this variable are picked up in the "Non-recurring cost for
breakout parameter," which appears separately in the model.
Currently the ABV calculation and the economic
analysis calculations are two distinct processes. In
reality the two calculations should be included in the same
equation. The model therefore includes a labor factor
parameter (variable U) for breakout review which includes
costs associated with the ABV determination/review process.
It is still necessary to include an ABV variable in the
model since it represents that fixed level of work necessary
to complete a breakout candidate review. The work
associated with this variable does not appear in any other
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parameter, therefore it is best left as a separate variable.
The Navy ABV labor factor was derived by FMSO. The
factor used in the NAVICP Breakout model includes only the
labor portion of three of the five variables used in the
FMSO factor. The First Article Testing cost element and the
contract differential cost are not included separately.
First Article Testing costs are included in the "test
specifications determination" data element (W4) under
breakout costs. The contract differential costs are not
included in the model because they are (1) negligible in
value, and (2) should correctly be considered as costs of
competition rather than costs of breakout.
Performance cost considerations are included in the
NAVICP Breakout model although the ICPs have not considered
them in the past. These costs are related to form, fit and
function design. If performance specifications are used, a
change to the system life parameter (n) might be necessary.
Any new item developed via a performance specification
should have the same service life as the item it is
replacing. If this is not the case, then the value for
system life requires revising.
The NAVICP Breakout model separates the future
demand into its two components; recurring demand (N]_) and
non-recurring demand (Ri) . The values for these two data
elements are readily available from the WSF. In most cases
the value for recurring demand in the WSF can generally be
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assumed to be accurate. The only exception would be in
cases of a WSF error, or a major shift in the demand trend
which is not yet visible in the quarterly demand forecasting
value.
The value for non-recurring demand may not be
accurate in the WSF. Other management data may be available
to program managers which is not visible in the WSF and
which would indicate a greatly different value. Causes for
the difference would be expected sales to foreign
governments, overhaul schedules for ships and their
equipments which are not visible via a planned requirement,
and new construction outfitting/delivery schedules
experiencing an increasing population growth which is not
yet reflected in increased failure rates. All of these
situations would result in a value much higher than the one
resident in the WSF. Therefore program management attention
is necessary to ensure these unique cases are included in
the breakout analysis.
The NAVICP Breakout model simplifies the
calculations required in the breakout savings determination.
The total dollar value of new items required over the life
of the system (T) is multiplied by the savings parameter and
the result is the breakout savings. This approach to the
breakout savings determination is considered to be accurate
enough. The NAVSEALOG model estimates the residual asset
value (RAV) and uses it in the final breakout determination.
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However, as mentioned previously, the use of RAV is tedious
and it does not provide a reasonable breakout savings value.
The proposed model also ensures that the carcass
regeneration rates for repairable items are considered.
This is necessary to ensure that the total life-time
requirement is not overstated by counting all demands as new
procurements when most will be satisfied by repair actions.
This methodology is included in the NAVSEALOG model but it
is not a consideration in the CABS or Modern Technologies
models.
The breakout savings parameter (p) can be set at one
of two values. The DAR Supplement No. 6 allows for use of
"either a savings factor of 2 5% or one determined under
local conditions and experience." [Ref. l:p. S6-303.5] The
ICPs have demonstrated breakout success rates in excess of
the 25% bench mark, therefore those rates should be applied.
The 34% rate for SPCC and the 60% rate for ASO are the
values used by FMSO in their latest study (1987) , and they
are considered acceptable for this breakout model's use.
3. Benefits of the NAVICP Breakout model
The NAVICP Breakout model is considered an
improvement over the other models examined for several
reasons. Most importantly, it combines the ABV process with
the economic analysis process. This combination reduces the
current time-consuming manual process of screening all the
items from the Stratification output review against an ABV
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value (at whatever value one sets it) , and then rescreening
all the breakout candidates again during the economic
analysis portion of breakout. The two steps are combined
into one, and a great deal of duplicative work can be
eliminated. The savings in the workload can allow a wider
range of items to be screened for breakout review action.
The automated data storage requirements for this
model are minimal since the majority of the data elements
are currently resident in the WSF. This reduces the number
of separate data files and unique breakout data elements
necessary in order to accomplish breakout. As the number of
unique breakout data requirements increases, so do the costs
associated with operating and maintaining the database.
The NAVICP Breakout model could easily be integrated
into the local breakout files currently existing at each
ICP. The programming effort required to computerize the
model is considered minimal. By computerizing the model,
obvious additional cost savings could be accrued.
Another benefit of this model is the flexibility in
regard to planned program requirements. It is estimated
that non-recurring demand accounts for the greatest volume
in many weapon systems' inventory spares procurements. [Ref.
9] If the WSF values for planned program requirements are
accurate enough, then one can use them for the economic
analysis. However, the NAVICP Breakout model allows for the
flexibility of manipulating the PPR values in order to
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obtain the correct value for non-recurring demand. The
NAVICP Breakout model allows for an update of this parameter
when it is necessary, whereas this is not possible in the
previously discussed models.
The NAVICP Breakout model considers the time value
of money in its calculations. This is a critical
consideration since the timing of the savings, and the
incursion of costs associated with those savings are
disjointed over time. Discounting is necessary to correct
for the time value of money and also to account for
inflationary effects. The CABS and Modern Technologies
models do not consider this critical aspect.
The methodology of the NAVICP Breakout model is
rather simple when compared to previous models. This
simplicity makes the model more attractive to those who are
required to use it. The computation which determines the
breakout savings is straightforward, and accounts for both
recurring and non-recurring demand. The parameters used to
determine the breakout costs account for the variables which
have the greatest impact on breakout candidate selections.
Values for use in the parameters are as accurate as the
information in the WSF. This simplicity would make
personnel training and computerization of the model rather
simple. Because of its simplicity, people should find it
easy to understand and use correctly.
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In conclusion, the NAVICP Breakout model combines
and summarizes those important parameters which impact on
the breakout process. It synthesizes the essence of
breakout and reduces the breakout problem to several
parameters which have been quantified or are easily-
determined . The NAVICP Breakout model is considered the
best model to use for application at the Navy ICPs.
F. SUMMARY
Three breakout models which are used within the DOD were
presented and discussed. The major data elements and
sources of data for these models were also discussed and
reviewed for adequacy. A proposed model for use at the Navy
ICPs was presented. This model, called the "NAVICP
Breakout" model, is a synthesis of the previously mentioned
models, and contains the positive aspects of each. Each of
the cost elements in the model are discussed. The NAVICP
Breakout model is a simple model which uses readily
available data, and accurately reflects those costs
elements inherent in the Navy breakout process.
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IV. RELATED PROVISIONING-BREAKOUT ISSUES
Throughout the research devoted to developing the NAVICP
Breakout model, many other breakout issues became evident.
These issues are not central to the parameters in the
breakout model, however they are considered germane to the
breakout issue in general and are worthy of discussion here.
A. TIMING OF TEOTNICAL DATA PROCUREMENT
The provisioning process is the one centralized effort
given to new equipments entering the Navy inventory to
ensure the correct configuration and supply support. To do
this, thorough technical reviews are necessary using
contractor furnished technical data. The timing for
provisioning is such that it usually occurs approximately
one year prior to equipment deliveries to the fleet.
However, this time frame varies depending upon the
sophistication of the equipment and the unique requirements
of the specific Provisioning Requirements Statement (PRS)
associated with the particular equipment contract.
Subsequent to provisioning, the life-cycle management
approach is one of "management by exception." Unless
something drastically wrong develops with the APL, or the
equipment is undergoing a major change in maintenance
philosophy, the original provisioning is not revisited.
Ongoing APL maintenance does occur, where stock numbers are
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updated or allowances changed, but these are minor when
compared to a reprovisioning effort where the APL is
basically reworked. For example, a recent reprovisioning
effort at SPCC involved more than 12,000 APLs and began in
1984. This effort is intended to correct maintenance
philosophy changes and to allow the APLs to be used for
depot-level maintenance, in addition to the organizational
and intermediate levels. The extent of the effort is major
and will take several years to complete. [Ref. 31]
As has been mentioned previously, the availability of
technical data is the one factor which ultimately will
determine if a breakout action will be successful or not.
This fact has been emphasized by several recent studies
completed by the Services. [Ref. 6:p. 1-3; Ref. 7:p. 4-1;
Ref. 32: p. 117] Technical data for breakout is usually
difficult to obtain or acquire since the breakout process
occurs at a time long past the provisioning period. This
can be up to 10 years past the original provisioning date,
but it averages approximately six years. After a period of
six years, obtaining data due under the original contract
but not provided or lost is very difficult and usually very
expensive to accomplish. In many cases the data are just
not available any longer, even from the original vendor.
The provisioning process and the breakout process both
require the indepth technical review of data in an attempt
to make a decision concerning a supply management action.
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In provisioning, the actions will determine the management
of the item and inventory control/stocking policies. In
breakout, the actions will determine whether the item will
be broken out to a second source. These two processes use
the same data and can be accomplished by the same technical
level of worker.
Therefore, the provisioning process is the ideal time to
complete the data requirements for breakout determination.
Both Navy ICPs have taken steps to integrate certain
breakout actions into the provisioning process (e.g.,
assigning AMC/AMSC combinations, completing DD Form 1423,
etc.). However, the technical data acquisition is still
left until a future date. The premise is that an item may
never pass the ABV threshold for breakout consideration,
therefore it will not be necessary to ever procure the
technical data.
This may be a sound management decision, however
additional research is necessary. Using the four past years
of history of breakout candidate selection and success, an
analysis should be conducted to determine if breakout
success can be correlated to item category or to group and
class combinations (e.g., FSC.) The outcome of such an
effort would give management personnel an idea of probable
breakout success groups based on past performance. Items
which have higher breakout potential would be better ones to
obtain additional technical data on, whereas items with low
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breakout success might not warrant any additional breakout
effort at all.
B. EQUIPMENT LEVEL BREAKOUT REVIEW
The current breakout process is concentrated at
reviewing items at the NSN level. It involves developing
technical packages at the item level. However, the
screening and data package preparation efforts are
repetitive in nature. Linked with the fact that the
technical data is the same for items on the same piece of
equipment; one can then achieve a labor reduction by
processing a group of items together vice just processing
the numerous individual items singularly.
If all the items of a complete equipment or component
(e.g.
,
a motor, pump or air compressor) were screened for
breakout action, the items would fall along some sort of
continuum from highly successful breakout candidates to ones
which should never be screened for breakout action. In
between these two extremes would be a wide range of items
where breakout action is marginal. These marginal
candidates would become positive candidates if one or more
of the breakout costs to process the item were reduced or
eliminated. If breakout items were grouped by equipments,
one could reduce the per item cost to screen the items and
therefore bring the marginal candidates into a positive
breakout status.
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A breakout initiative at SPCC is under way in which
several equipments were reviewed at the equipment level for
determining breakout candidates. [Ref. 33] The outcome of
this approach looks very promising, in that breakout rates
have been consistently higher than the general breakout
rate. The final results of this initiative are not yet
available, however the approach appears to work.
Manufacturers tend to be more amenable to providing
technical data if approached at an equipment level once,
vice being approached several times over the course of a
year for technical data on individual items. [Ref. 29] In
most cases the technical data are very similar for all the
items in an individual equipment, and if the Government is
approaching manufacturers individually it could be paying
twice for the same data.
The Competition Advocates at the two Navy ICPs indicated
that certain manufacturers are quite willing to cooperate
with breakout efforts, while others are not as interested.
These cooperative vendors are more willing to provide
technical data than the others. ASO is even linked via
computer to the data files of several of the prime aircraft
contractors (e.g., Pratt & Whitney, Lockheed, Sikorsky,
Rolls-Royce, and Grumman to name only a few). [Ref. 8] The
emphasis should be to group items at the equipment level and
then approach the responsible manufacturer for the required
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technical data. Those manufacturers who are more willing to
supply data should be approached first.
In the past the Navy ICPs have been both equipment and
weapon systems oriented. Now both are being organized
strongly around the major weapon systems they support. The
program management, inventory management, and provisioning
will all operate on a systems perspective. With the
expertise being aligned in this manner, it would seem
logical to operate breakout in a similar manner.
C. TECHNICAL DATA STORAGE
A GAO study indicates that the Services are not getting
all the technical data that they have paid for and that, for
data they do obtain, they are not doing a thorough enough
job screening it for accuracy and completeness. [Ref. 18 :p.
1] Because ICPs have a great need for accurate and complete
data, the careful screening of the data needs to be
accomplished when received. Data receipt is the only time
when the contractor can be held accountable for inadequate
or missing technical data. If data are missing or not in
accordance with the CDRL, immediate feedback to the
contractor is necessary.
A major issue to be resolved is the receipt and review
of technical data. Data are still being received in
microfilm and in hardcopy format. In order to integrate new
electronic data storage measures, system acquisition
contracts must incorporate data receipt via digitized format
69
within the CDRLs and PRSs. Additionally, more resources are
required to check contractor input against CDRL requirements
to ensure that all the necessary technical data are being
received. For this effort to be achieved, technical
screening at the ICPs and at the field contract
administration offices (i.e., at the SUPSHIPs and NAVPROs)
must be improved.
The technical data issue will plague the breakout effort
until better methods evolve to not only procure, but also to
store, validate and maintain as updated, the vast amount of
technical data required to continue the breakout process. A
major Navy initiative is the Engineering Data Management
Information and Control System (EDMICS) , an automated data
storage and retrieval system.
EDMICS is designed to provide state-of-the-art
management information to 3 6 Navy and four DLA engineering
data repositories. [Ref. 2: p. 15] The existing inventory
of hardcopy and microfilm drawings will be scanned,
digitized and permanently stored on optical disks. This
system will greatly improve the retrieval aspects of data
management between ICPs and field engineering activities.
The Navy is also actively engaged in the development of
the Navy Standard Information System (NTIS) , a data
communications architecture and data exchanges standards for
application in computer-aided logistics support. The NTIS
project, in conjunction with EDMICS, will provide an update
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to the technical data handling system which would be equal
to that of the leaders in the industry.
D. INTANGIBLE ASPECTS OF BREAKOUT
A last important aspect of the breakout process which
needs emphasis is the consideration of intangible aspects of
the breakout process. Many occasions exist where the
results of the strict breakout economic analysis indicate
that a negative breakout decision should be made. However,
this strict view does not consider the political environment
of the breakout process, which may indicate that an item
should be broken out even if the economic analysis is
negative. Even though this decision process cannot be
easily aided by a quantifiable data element, it warrants
active consideration when breakout decisions are being made.
An example would be the procurement of technical data
from a sole-source prime contractor with which the
Government has a history of pricing problems. If the
technical data can be obtained by the Government then future
procurements problems could be eliminated via the
competition process. If the economic analysis of the item
is positive, the item will become a prime candidate for
breakout action. If the economic analysis is negative, it
would not be considered for breakout action. However, in
this case the pricing issue is more important than the
economic one, and breakout should be accomplished.
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E. SUMMARY
Four topics related to breakout have been presented and
discussed which impact on the breakout process. The timing
of technical data procurement, the application of breakout
reviews at the equipment level, the technical data storage
problem and the intangible aspects of breakout are all
issues pertinent to the breakout process. However, they are
not quantifiable in any model form. These issues were the
result of the literature reviewed and the interviews
conducted while working on the proposed breakout model.
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V. SUMMARY. CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The following summary, conclusions and recommendations
are presented as a result of this study.
A. SUMMARY
The background of the breakout program and the
provisioning process used at the Navy Inventory Control
Points were reviewed. The major issues and concerns
associated with these two processes were analyzed in an
effort to determine the groundwork common to both of them.
The research indicates that these two processes are related
most notably in the requirement for technical data.
Problems associated with technical data and its procurement
were also discussed and reviewed.
Three breakout models used within DOD were reviewed and
analyzed. The object of this review was to determine the
cost elements associated with breakout that have been
quantified by the other Services. This review culminated in
the identification of those costs which would most
accurately describe breakout for the Navy's Inventory
Control Points. These data elements were then incorporated
into a new model called the NAVICP Breakout Model. The
NAVICP Breakout model, its input parameters and its benefits
were then discussed indepth.
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The final chapter reviewed several breakout related
issues which became evident as a result of the research.
These include timing of technical data procurement for
breakout and provisioning, equipment level breakout, data
storage, and intangible aspects of breakout. Resolution of
these issues are necessary in order to improve the breakout
process.
B. CONCLUSIONS
Conclusion No. 1. The current breakout process has
worked basically the same since its inception in 1983, with
the publication of DAR Supplement No. 6. The corporate
knowledge has grown since that time, and better breakout
processes have been discovered. It is time that some of
that knowledge be applied to improving the DOD-wide breakout
methodology. This involves combining the breakout process
with the provisioning process in order to prevent
unnecessary duplicative item review actions, while improving
the procurement of technical data.
Conclusion No. 2. Several models have been developed
for determining breakout candidates. Although the models
contain data necessary for academic purposes, their
application to real-world situations is difficult to do.
Using these models in the "real world" can result in better
screening, but at a reduced processing rate, and at a higher
cost per item screened. A model which captures the data
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mechanically, and which can accomplish the tedious analysis
automatically is needed.
Conclusion No. 3. The breakout process is very
difficult to administer and track. The process has many
players, not all of whom are actively interested in the
process. SPCC has a very difficult time in the area of
technical review since all breakout candidates must be
approved by NAVSEA. NAVAIR has allowed ASO a freer hand in
the process, and therefore ASO has been able to apply some
innovative breakout techniques. In order to improve on the
breakout program, uniform policy and goals for all of the
breakout players is necessary.
Conclusion No. 4. The current process for "counting"
breakout candidates should be revamped, and clearly
determined between all the breakout players. Currently the
ICPs and the ISEAs are graded on the number of breakout
reviews completed. However, NAVSUP controls the ICPs by
also requiring a specific success rate. In contrast, the
ISEAs which work for NAVSEA and not NAVSUP, are only
assigned a goal to review a certain number of breakout
packages. These goals only require the completion of a
certain number of breakout reviews; they do not require a
specific success rate. Because of this it is therefore
possible that an ISEA could complete all of its assigned
breakout reviews, but have a zero percent breakout rate.
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This phenomenon currently occurs at several ISEAs supporting
SPCC.
Conclusion No. 5. The breakout philosophy should be
applied at the complete equipment level, and not just to the
individual NSN level . The potential for breakout exists for
many items which by themselves currently do not meet the
economic threshold for breakout. The pioneer work at SPCC
indicates that this is an area which will bear much fruit.
The research on determining the feasibility of FSC
correlation and annual usage rate should also be further
explored.
Conclusion No. 6. Technical data procurement is the
most difficult part of the breakout process. The success of
breakout rests on the availability of technical data. The
best time to procure technical data is when the contractor
is contractually bound to provide it as part of an equipment
contract. Provisioning Technical Data (PTD) receipt is the
best time to catch incorrect, missing and incomplete
technical data.
Conclusion No. 7. Better technical data management is
also necessary in order to store the data that are
collected. The Navy's automated technical data storage and
retrieval system (EDMICS) needs to be expanded and brought
on line at the ICPs. This system could greatly aid the
technical data handling requirements of the breakout
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program, in addition to aiding in the many other ICP
functions which rely heavily upon technical data.
Conclusion No. 8. NAVSEA should provide SPCC with the
authority to make breakout decisions, in the similar manner
that NAVAIR has provided ASO with breakout authority on
noncritical items. This would require a better working
relationship between SPCC and NAVSEA, and also require that
SPCC increase its staff of qualified engineering personnel.
If this were done, the cost of reviewing SPCC breakout
candidates would decrease. This would allow items with a
lessor ABV threshold to be reviewed. The decrease in
breakout review costs would also have positive effects on
the breakout success rates.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendation No. 1. It is recommended that the NAVICP
Breakout model be implemented at the Navy Inventory Control
Points for use in breakout candidate determination. This
model combines the annual buy value calculation with the
breakout economic computation, and it will simplify the
overall breakout analysis.
Recommendation No. 2. In regard to the NAVICP Breakout
model, additional analysis should be done to compute a range
of values for the non-recurring cost for breakout parameter
(i.e. the U parameter) based on equipment complexity. This
would allow for a tailored range of labor values that would
more closely correspond to the actual labor cost needed to
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breakout the equipment. This fine-tuning effort could
improve the breakout program success rate by allowing for a
closer look at lower cost items.
Recommendation No. 3. It is recommended that breakout
goals be universal for all of the breakout players. A more
realistic approach might be a goal to breakout a specific
dollar amount per year, or to establish a specific breakout
percentage at each In-Service Engineering Activity. This
approach would stimulate the technical activities to
undertake a more thorough breakout review methodology.
Recommendation No. 4. Technical data received from
contractors by ICPs requires better screening and it must be
more closely checked against the CDRLs for data
appropriateness and completeness. This requires both
indepth screening at the ICPs and also better control by the
field contract administrative organizations (i.e., the
SUPSHIPs, NAVPROs, etc.). If technical data is not
corrected at the time of receipt, then recouping the lost
information at a later time is usually not possible.
Recommendation No. 5. Breakout planning needs to be
considered during the acquisition planning and concept
evaluation phases of weapon systems acquisition. Decisions
on technical data procurement and life-cycle support must
include breakout consideration.
Recommendation No. 6. Items coded AMSC K, M, and N
should not be automatically rejected from breakout
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consideration. The current level of manufacturing
technology should reduce the number of items being assigned
these restrictive codes.
D. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
An area for further research would be an investigation
of the feasibility of incorporating breakout information on
the Lead APLs used by the ICPs during the provisioning
process. Additional research should also be done on the




1. What areas are the most successes coming in? Are there
specific systems, manufacturers^ platforms, systems or




Are items reviewed at the system/equipment level or are
they accomplished at the NSN level only? Have any
system level reviews been done? What have the results
been?
3. What are the top dozen (or so) "hard nut" equipments,
manufacturers, or systems that have been the most
difficult to get any successful breakout candidates
from? What are the specific reasons for the problems?
4 What systems or equipments would create the greatest
breakout success if it were possible to break them out?
•'
' [i.e., what equipments (systems) currently not broken
out would be the one with the greatest benefits if it
were to be successfully broken out? What is keeping it
from happening?]
5. What is the process used from initial candidate
identification to the successful completion of the
breakout process? [i.e.. Do you have a flow-chart that
details the breakout process?]
6. Do you have any figures which detail the average length
of time required to complete the various steps in the
breakout process?
7. What are the various factors (criteria) used to
determine if an item is a breakout candidate (i.e., AMC
coding alone, ANSC plus AMC coding, etc.)?
8 What is the accuracy of the AMC and AMSC codes in the
WSF in regard to their use in determining breakout
candidates? (i.e.. Are they only 75% accurate, better
worse, better for some items, worse for others.)
9o What is the most difficult aspect of the breakout
process?
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10. How long is the approval process from the HSC on
breakout items? Does it vary between consumable and
repairable items?
11. Is the breakout process different between consumable and
repairable items? Which is easiest to do? What cogs




Are there different criteria between consumable and
repairable items?
13. What outside help (outside of your breakout
group/division/section) is necessary to complete
breakout of an item (i.e., contacting support, program
office support, ADP support, etc.)?
14. What starts the breakout process (i.e., just the STRAT
process or is there something else tied to it)?
15. What is the track record of breakout at your command in
regard to its success? I'm looking for some more
quantitative info than just the bottom-line stuff that
NAVSUP publishes in their Annual Report, if you have it
available.
16. What data in the WSF is used for breakout (i.e., What
DENS are required to be complete in order to do a full-
screen breakout? What DENS are required for a limited-
screen breakout, if different? How accurate is the
information in these DENS? Are there any specific DENS
which are problem areas in regard to accuracy?)?
17. Since breakout's institutionalization at your command,
what has been the annual average cost to breakout an
item? Are there any stats available by year broken down
by COG or SMIC? (I'm trying to get a feel if the cost
to breakout an item is increasing in cost per item
within cog or smic.)
18. Are there any unique breakout techniques or
"discoveries" that you have found during the breakout
process that are worthy of note (i.e., the ASO
computerized database, etc.)?
19. Is breakout getting more difficult or easier to
accomplish? What do you see are the reasons driving
this? What actions would be the greatest help to you in




20. What is the level of support that your HSCs provide to
you in breakout accomplishment? What could they do to
improve on the current situation?
21. What is the average number of days to complete a
breakout package, and to get it improved by the HSC?
(Please breakout it down by COG or SMIC if available.)
Is the trend increasing, decreasing or remaining
constant?
22. In regard to the ALRAND Working Memo 525 of Dec
1986. . . . What is the trend on failure items being
rescreened? (Is the size of the body of failure to
screen items on the increase, decrease or remaining
constant? I'm trying to determine if any trends exist,
on items which are failures to screen one year and
subsequently successfully screened the next.) Do you
have a listing of several years worth of failure to
screen items?
23. What are the maximum number of full-screen reviews that
can be completed each year? What is the rate per
person? Will the staff increase in the near future?
24. Are the number of breakout candidates increasing or
decreasing each year? With the "better" data rights
requirements being incorporated into new contracts by
DOD, the pool of candidates should be decreasing. Is
this phenomenon being observed?
25. Is the data for new items in fact better then the data
for older items (i.e.. Is the information accompanying
newly provisioned items more accurate and of better
quality than items from the data of 5 years ago? Of 2
years ago? I'm trying to determine if any of the DOD
initiatives to get better rights data up front is
appearing yet in the WSF)
?
26. What automated database system does SPCC use to automate
the breakout process? What are the inputs to the
database? How often is it updated? How effective is
the use of the system?
27. What is the current FYS 7 projected breakout rate? What
was last year's breakout rate?
28. Do you see any problems or inaccuracies in the ALRAND
study of Dec 1986? If so what are they?
29. How successful is the "Competition Advocate Buy
Requirements Listing" in generating breakout items? Is
it an SPCC initiative or something out of NAVSUP?
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30. What is the objective of Bailment? Is it for vendors to
develop Technical Data Packages for the government
procurement activities? How cost-effective is it? Any
major results or examples of its success? What is the
expected cost avoidance of the program? What is the




ACQUISITION METHOD CODES (AMC)
[Ref. l:p. S6-201.1]
AMC EXPLANATION
1 Item screened and suitable for competitive
acquisition.
2 Item screened and suitable for competitive
acquisition for the first time.
3 Acquire, for the second or subsequent time,
directly from the actual manufacturer; whether
or not the prime contractor is the actual
manufacturer
.
4 Acquire, for the first time, directly from the
actual manufacturer; whether or not the prime
contractor is the actual manufacturer.
5
.
Acquire directly from the prime contractor
even though the engineering data identify the
Federal Supply Code for Manufacturers (FSCM)




ACQUISITION METHOD SUFFIX CODE fAMSC)
[Ref. l:p. S6-201.2]
AMSC EXPLANATION
A The Government's rights to use data in
its possession is questionable.
B Acquisition of the part is restricted to
sources specified on "Source Control,"
"Altered Item" or "Selected Item"
drawings/documents
.
C The part requires engineering source
approval by the design control activity





G The Government has unlimited rights to
the technical data, and the data package
is complete.
H The Government physically does not have
in its possession sufficient, accurate or
legible data to purchase the part from
other than current sources.
J Not used.
K The part must be produced from class lA
castings (e.g., class 1 of MIL-C-6021)
and similar type forgings.
L The annual buy value of this part falls
below the screening threshold of $10,000
but it has been screened for known
sources.
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M Master or coordinated tooling is required
to produce this part; which is not owned
or available from the Government.
N The part requires special test and/or
inspection facilities to determine and
maintain ultraprecision quality for its
function or system integrity.
P The rights to use the data needed to
purchase the part from additional sources
are not owned by the Government and
cannot be purchased.
Q Not used.
R The data or the rights to use the data
needed to purchase the part from
additional sources are not owned by the
Government, and it has been determined
that it is uneconomical to purchase them.
S Not used.
T Acquisition of the part is controlled by
QPL procedures.
U The cost to the Government to breakout
the part and acquire it competitively has
been determined to exceed the projected
savings over the life span of the part.
V The part has been designated a high
reliability part under a formal
reliability program. Probability of
failure would be unacceptable from the
standpoint of safety of personnel and/or
equipment.
W Not used.




ACQUISITION METHOD/SUFFIX CODE CORRELATION TABLE
[Ref. l:p. S6-33]
A^ABCGHKLMNPRTUVY
1 • • • • • • #
2 • • • • • • •
3 • • • • • •
4 • • • • • •
5 • • •
NOTE: Those blocks indicated by a dot are valid
combinations of Acquisition Method Code (AMC) and
Acquisition Method Suffix Code (AMSC.) As an example, the
combination of AMC 1 and AMSC Y is invalid. This
combination would indicate that it is acceptable to obtain
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Hardware Systems Commands (HSC) required documents for
equipment support and provisioning:
Military Standards
MIL-STD-12 Abbreviations for use on Drawings,
Specifications, Standards and in
Technical Typ(= Publications
DOD-STD-lOO Engineering Drawings Practices
MIL-STD-789C Contractor Technical Information Coding
of Replenishment Parts
MIL-STD-1388-1A Logistic Support Analysis
MIL-STD-1388-2A Logistics Support Analysis Record (LSAR)
Requirements
MIL-STD-1561B Uniform DOD Provisioning Procedures
Military Specifications
DOD-D-1000 Drawings, Engineering and Associated
Lists
MIL-C-9877 Cards, Aperture
MIL-F-7024 Fluids, Calibrating, for Aircraft Fuel
System Components
MIL-M-9868 Microfilming of Engineering Documents
3 5MM, Requirements for
Federal Manuals/Catalogs/Standards
FED-STD-5 General Pattern Standard





Federal Supply Code for Manufacturers,
Code to Name
Federal Item Name Directory for Supply
Cataloging
H6-2 Federal Handbook of Pattern Descriptions





















Packaging Requirements Data Report
Contractor Technical Information Coding
of Replenishment Parts








Provisioning Parts List (PPL)
Tools and Test Equipment (TTEL)
Common and Bulk Items List (CBIL)
Design Change Notice (DCN)
Item Logistics Data Record (ILDR)
Provisioning and Other Preprocurement
Screening Data
System Configuration Provisioning List
(SCPL)
Provisioning Parts List Index (SPLI)
Statement of Prior Submission (SPS)
Defense Acquisition Regulations (formerly







DOD Provisioning and Other Preprocurement
Screening Manual
Federal Acquisition Regulations
Naval Material Command (NMC) Uniform
Source, Maintenance and Recoverability
(SM&R) Codes
SPCCINST 4441.170 Coordinated Shipboard Allowance List
(COSAL) Use and Maintenance Manual
Industry Documents
ANSI Y 32.16
ANSI Y 3 2.2
Reference Designations for Electrical and
Electronics Parts and Equipments




REPLENISHMENT PARTS BREAKOUT PROGRAM























































































































































CONTINUATION OF REPLENISHMENT PARTS BREAKOUT PROGRAM









































































































CONTINUATION OF REPLEMISHMENT PARTS BREAKOUT PROGRAM
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Breakout efforts will continue for the life of a part or
until such time as the part is coded as follows:
AMC/AMSC EXPLANATION
IG Item suitable for competitive
acquisition; the Government possesses
complete data and unlimited rights.
2G Item suitable for competitive
acquisition for the first time; the
Government possesses complete data with
unlimited rights.
IK Item suitable for competitive
acquisition, but a source capable of
producing Class lA castings is required.
2K Item suitable for competitive
acquisition for the first time, but a
source capable of producing Class lA
castings is required.
IM Item suitable for competitive
acquisition, but master tooling is
required.
2M Item suitable for competitive
acquisition for the first time, but
master tooling is required.
IN Item suitable for competitive
acquisition, but special testing is
required.
2N Item suitable for competitive
acquisition for the first time, but
special testing is required.
IT Item suitable for competitive
acquisition, but item is controlled by a
Qualified Producers List (QPL)
.
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2T Item suitable for competitive
acquisition for the first time, but item
is controlled by a QPL.
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APPENDIX J
AIR FORCE APPROACH TO ABV DETERMINATION
[Ref. 11]
The three approaches to determining Air Force ABV are
provided as follows:
METHOD 1: For use when manpower is not a data element.
ABV =
c + ab + fF
aP




= cost to process a Form 761 (Air Force
breakout form)
First Article Testing costs
average cost per screening that does not
yield AMC 1^ 2 [c = $80 actual]
fraction of screened actions resulting in
breakout (AMC 1,2) [a = 0.28]
average additional cost per screening
that yields AMC 1,2 [b = $220 actual]
fraction of screened items receiving
first article testing [f = 0.08 actual]
average cost per first article test
[F = $590 actual]
average fraction of ABV saved by
competitive procurement [P = 0.35]
annual buy value
METHOD 2 For use when manpower is a data element,







number of people (including all support
people [N = 48 actual]
average annual salary of N [S = $28,886
actual use GS 11/05]
total cost for developing a bidders
package [X = $189,594 per year]
number of items screened per year [B
= 8464 actual]
fraction of screened items that result in




fraction of savings on competitive buy
[D = 0.3 5 actual]
The quick-cut approach.
ABV = A + B









AFLC Form 761 processing cost [A = $75]
first article testing cost [B = $448]
competitive s o 1 i c i t a t i on/ awa r
d
differential [C = $111]
competitive solicitation bid set
preparation and mailing [D = $3 09]
savings factor [SF = 0.25]
In method 3, the C, D, and SF factors were multiplied by 5
in order to determine a five year average.






NAVY ABV COMPUTATIONS USING
AIR FORCE METHODOLOGY
Method 1 is used to determine Navy ABVs with the Air Force
model
,
^T,T7 (c + ab) + fFGiven: ABV = -^^ ^aP
where, (c + ab) = cost per item to complete
breakout
fF = cost per item for First Article
Testing (FAT)
a = breakout success rate [SPCC
= 0.34, ASO = 0.60]
P = average fraction saved through
breakout [SPCC = ASO = 0.31]
Assumption from the FMSO study: FAT would cost $2 00 per
test and apply to 4 0% of the items.
ASO: (c + ab) = ^"^^6^395^^ = $1,104.25
fF = ($200) (.40) (6,395) ^ ^qq6,395
therefore: ABV = '^"^:"' t '^?°' = ?6,366.94
( . 60 ) ( . 31)
ABV(ASO) = $6,367
SPCC: (c + ab) = ^-^ ''^^-,^ '^^^ = $389.54
' 4 , 316
^P _ ($200) (.40) (4,316) _ ^„^fF -
^-j^ - $80
therefore: ABV = ^^^^^ . 54 ) + ($80) ^ 53 ^5^^
ABV(SPCC) = $3,506




FY 1987 SPCC BREAKOUT SUCCESS GOALS/RATES BY ISEA
[Ref. 35]
The following is the breakout success goals and achieved
rates of breakout success for SPCC in FY 1987.
COGNIZANT TECHNICAL FY1987 FY1987 SUCCESS
ACTIVITY GOAL COMPLETION RATE
NAVSEA 06
NWSC CRANE 100 70 35.7%
NOSC SAN DIEGO 25 59 89.8%
NWSC EARLE NA NA
NCSC PORT HUENEME 1100 1033 43.9%
NCSC ST. INIGOES 100 94 80.9%
NOS INDIAN HEAD 50 11 100.0%
NOS LOUISVILT.F 350 401 59.4%
NUSC NEW LONDON NA 47 36.2%
NCSC NORFOLK 2000 1187 31.3%
NUSC NEWPORT 250 254 44.5%
NUSC KEYPORT 175 207 64.7%
NADC WARMINSTER 100 94 0.0%
NWSC YORKTOWN 50 56 0.0%
NAVSESS PHILADELPHIA NA 3 100.0%
NAVSEA 05 3100 2396 16.3%
NAVSEA 08 NA 395 75.2%
NAVAIR 280 258 18.2%
SPAWAR 1480 772 15.4%
TOTAL 9160 7337 .
"
SPCC GOAL 10500 10507**
DIFFERENCE 1340* 3170**
*This difference is accounted for by completing technical
referrals, which are easier than breakout actions but are
counted the same as one.
**This was actually made up by technical referrals and DLA
inquiries. SPCC actually completed 10507 breakout
screenings with a success rate of 29.6% for FY 1987.
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APPENDIX M
CONTRACTOR TECHNICAL INFORMATION CODES
[Ref. l:p. S6-201.3]
Contractors shall use the following codes when MIL-STD-789C
is invoked in the CDRL:
CTIC EXPLANATION
CB Source controlled item in accordance with
"source control", "altered item" or "selected
item" drawing/document. [The contractor shall
furnish a list of the sources with this
code.
]
CC Engineering source approval required by the
design control activity in order to maintain
the quality of the part. An alternate source
must qualify in accordance with the design
control activity's procedures.
CG No technical restrictions exist to
competition.
CK Item produced with Class lA castings or
similar type forgings. Development and use
of high-integrity castings is required. [The
contractor shall furnish a list of known
sources for obtaining castings and forgings
with this code.]
CM Master or coordinated tooling is required to
produce this item. [The contractor shall
furnish a list of the firms possessing the
master or coordinated tooling with this
code.
CN This item requires special test or inspection
to determine and maintain ultra-precision
quality for function or system integrity.
[The contractor shall furnish a list of the




CP The rights to use the data needed to purchase
this part from additional sources are not
owned by the Government and cannot be
purchased.
CV A critical part or high reliability part
under a formal reliability program. Failure
of this part would be unacceptable from the
standpoint of safety of personnel or
equipment. Continued control by the existing
source is necessary to ensure acceptable
reliability. [The contractor shall identify
the existing source with this code.]
CY The part is design unstable. Configuration
design, manufacturing or performance changes
in this part are anticipated. [The contractor





VALUES FOR NAVICP BREAKOUT MODEL PARAMETERS
[Ref. 26:p. 1-5]
Values for Fj^ determined via the following equation:
n
(1 + i)l + (1 + i)2 + ... + (1 + i)n
n
This is the factor which when multiplied by the price,
results in the average price over n years. Values for F^^
for n = 1 through n = 48 are given below. [Ref. 36 :p. 9]











































































Simple hose, bar round,








spacers, inlet duct, coupling,





clutch, shaft assembly, double-
sided circuit card assembly
valve, gear unit, power supply,
rotor assembly, proximity
switch, antenna mast, pump,
multi-layer circuit card
assembly




Note: If the item under review does not appear as one of
the examples listed, the level of complexity shall be
assigned as deemed appropriate by the reviewer.
















Note: Costs for visual and dimensional analysis for parts
which do not fit into one of the above complexity levels,
should be estimated using the above table as a guide.
Wo: Drawings Development. Use $700 per each required
drawing as a guide.
W3 : Material
Specifications Use $2 50 per component as a
guide.
















Note: Costs for test specifications for parts which do not
fit into one of the above complexity levels, should be
estimated using the above as a guide.
W5 : Possible Destruction of One Part. Use the replacement
cost available from WSF (DEN B055).
Wg: Technical Management Cost, Technical costs should are
estimated to be 10% of the sum of W^ through W5.
W7 : Reverse Engineering. If reverse engineering is used
for breakout, estimate the cost at $25,000 per item; and
consider all other costs as zero.
Average Remaining Service Life (n) for Economic Analysis.
Ship Class n
SUBMARINES
Ohio Class (SSBN 726-749) 29
Benjamin Franklin & Lafayette Classes (SSBN 616-659) 9
Los Angeles Class (SSN 688-773) 27
Glenard P. Lipscomb (SSN 685) 18
Narwhal (SSN 671) 13
Sturgeon Class (SSN 637-687) 14
Ethan Allen Class (SSN 609-618) 6
George Washington Class (SSN 598-601) 4
Permit Class (SSN 594-621) 9
Tullibee (SSN 597) 4
Skipjack Class (SSN 585-592) 5
Skate Class (SSN 578-584) 2
Barbel Class (SS 580-582) 3
Dolphin Class (AGSS 555) 12
AIRCRAFT CARRIERS
Nimitz Class (CVN 68-75) 40
Enterprise Class (CVN 65) 20
Kitty Hawk & John F. Kennedy Class (CV 63-67) 23
Forrestal Class (CV 59-62) 11
Midway CLASS (CV 41 & 43) 5
Intreped Class (CV 31 & 34) 5
Modernized Essex Class (CVS 12 & 20) 3
LARGE COMBATANTS
Iowa CLass Battleship (BB 61-64) 15
Virginia Class (CGN 38-41) 22
California Class (CGN 36 & 37) 19
Truxton Class (CGN 35) 11
Bainbridge Class (CGN 25) 6
Long Beach Class (CGN 9) 5
Ticonderoga Class (CG 47-70) 30
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Belknap Class (CG 26-34) 10
Leahy Class (CG 16-24) 7
DESTROYERS
Arleigh Burke Class (DDG 50) 35
Kidd Class (DDG 993-996) 25
Coontz Class (DDG 37-46) 4
Charles F. Adams Class (DDG 2-24) 6
Forrest Sherman & Hull Class 3
FRIGATES
Oliver Hazard Perry Class (FFG 7-61) 27
Brooke Class (FFG 1-6) 11
Knox Class (FF 1052-1097) 15
Garcia Class (FF 1044-1051) 10
Glover Class (FF 1098) 9
Bronstein Class (FF 1037 & 1038) 7
MISC
Auxiliaries 23




1. Acquisition Method Code (AMC) . A numeric code assigned
by a procurement activity to document the results of a
technical review of a particular part. [Ref. l:p. S6-
103.1]
2. Acquisition Method Suffix Code (AMSC) . An alpha code
assigned by a procurement activity to further describe
the acquisition status of a part by providing
information concerning engineering, manufacturing, and
technical data. [Ref. l:p. S6-103.2]
3. Actual Manufacturer. A manufacturer, who may or may not
be the prime contractor, having the design control
responsibility for a part. The actual manufacturer may




Annual Buy Value (ABV) . The forecast quantity of a part
required for the next twelve months multiplied by it's
unit price. [Ref. l:p. S6-103]
5. Bailment. The process whereby an item is leased to a
nongovernment recipient with the agreement that the same
item will be returned at a future time. The Government
retains legal title to the item. The contractor uses
the item in order to develop a technical data package
for use in reprocurement. Reverse engineering uses this
technique for developing data packages. [Ref. 37: p. 14-
4]
6. Breakout. The improvement of the acquisition status of
a part by deliberate management action to buy a spare
part competitively which was previously bought
noncompetitively, or to buy a part from the actual
manufacturer which was previously bought from the prime
contractor who is not the actual manufacturer of the
part. [Ref. l:p. S6-103.6]
7. Component Breakout. When breakout action is taken at a
component level, usually as a result of form, fit, and
function analysis.
8. Contract Data Requirements Lists (CDRL) . A contract
form, DD form 1423 which is used to list all technical
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data required to be delivered under the contract. [Ref.
2 3
:
p . App . B
]
9. Contractor. The supplier of the end item and associated
support items to the Government under the terms of a
specified contract. [Ref. 14: p. 3]
10. Contractor Technical Information Coding (CTIC) . An
alpha code assigned by a prime contractor to furnish
specific information regarding the technical data for a
part. [Ref. l:p. S6-103.7]
11. Data Item Description (DID) . A detailed description and
identification of data to be procured and delivered
through contractual means. [Ref. 4: p. IIIA-1-3]
12. Data Repository. A DOD entity responsible for
receiving, cataloging, storing, and retrieving technical
data. [Ref. 23:p. App. B]
13. Design Control Activity (DCA) . The contractor or
Government activity assigned responsibility for the
design of a particular part and for the preparation and
maintenance of current engineering drawings and
technical data for the part. [Ref. l:p. S6-103.9]
14. End Item. A final combination of end products,
component parts, and/or material which is ready for its
intended use, e.g., receiver, recorder, rifle, ship, or
aircraft. [Ref. 4:p. IIIA-1-3]
15. Lead Allowance Parts Lists (LAPLs) . Used for guidance
during the provisioning process for the deteirmination of
the range and depth of onboard repair part quantities,
as well as the preparation of APLs. The LAPL contains
data elements which represent the approved maintenance
philosophy for the specific type of equipment. [Ref.
4:p. IIIA-1-4]
16. Life Cycle Buy Value. The total dollar value of
procurements that are estimated to occur over a part's
remaining life cycle. [Ref. 29]
17. Manufacturer. A person or firm who owns and operates a
factory or establishment that produces, on the premises,
materials, supplies, articles or equipment required
under the contract. [Ref. 14: p. 4]
18. Prime Contractor. A contractor having responsibility
for design control and/or delivery of a
system/equipment such as an aircraft, engine, ship.
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tank, vehicle, gun, electronic system, or test
equipment. [Ref. 14: p. 4]
19. Provisioning. The process of determining the range and
quantity of items (i.e., spares and repair parts,
special tools, test equipment and support equipment)
required to support and maintain an end item of material
for an initial period of service. [Ref. 4:p. IIIA-1-2]
20. Provisioning Requirements Statement (PRS) . Specific
provisioning requirements will be stated in the PRS.
The PRS (DD Form 1949-2) will be included in the
solicitation or contract. The PRS, in conjunction with
the applicable DD Form 1423 (CDRL) entries, will
delineate the specific procedural and deliverable data
requirements applicable to a particular solicitation or
contract. [Ref. 14 :p. 5]
21. Provisioning Technical Documentation (PTD) . The
documentation furnished by contractors for the purpose
of identification, determination of repair parts
requirements, cataloging and contractual formalization
of items to be procured through the provisioning
process. The applicable Provisioning Military
Specifications such as MIL-STD-1552 , MIL-STD-1388 , MIL-
STD-1561, etc., specify format and content of PTD. PTD
includes, but is not limited to. Provisioning Lists,
associated drawings, item descriptions, and EAM cards.
[Ref. 4:p. IIIA-1-7]
22. Replenishment Spare Part. A consumable or repairable
part purchased after provisioning of that part used for
replacement, replenishment of stock, or use in the
maintenance, overhaul, and repair of equipment. [Ref.
l:p. S6-102.ll]
23. Reprocurement Data. A composition of specifications,
plans, drawings, standards, and other data sufficient to
permit the competitive follow-on procurement of an item.
[Ref. 23 :p. App. B]
24. Reverse Engineering. The process by which parts are
examined and analyzed to determine how they are
manufactured, for the purpose of developing a complete
technical data package including Level III drawings.
The purpose is to develop a data package on an item
suitable for manufacture by a second source. [Ref. 10]
25. Source Code. A code assigned to the item indicating the
source (procured, manufactured, assembled) from which
the item will be obtained. [Ref. 4:p. IIIA-1-8]
110
26. Technical Data. Specifications plans, drawings, and
standards used to describe the Government's requirements
for acquisition. [Ref. l:p. S6-103.12]
27. Vendor Item. An item which is attached to the end item
produced by the contractor and which is procured by the
contractor on the open market or from established
sources and for which the contractor is not the design
activity. [Ref. 14 :p. 5]
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